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On the background of the permanent agression and hybride 
wars launched by Russia against the neighbouring states, the 
topic of its participation in the war of Abkhazia of 1992-1993 
is getting more and more current and actual. The study of the 
issue makes obvious the fact, that Russian and Abkhazian his-
toriography and political jounalism permanetely try to revise 
and falsify the tragic pages of the newest history of Georgia and 
precisely participation and involvement of Russia in the war, 
deciding the fate of the war and brought Georgia on the edge of 
the Nation catastrophe. 
The schemes of the Abkhazian war and stamps were deep-
ly imprinted into the informational policy of the Kremlin and 
separatists, as well as in the works of different authors and pub-
lications1. The aim of all this production is to muffle the po-
litical and diplomatic involvement of Russia in the war. That 
time political and military elite of the Kremlin play the role of 
mediators and neutral force and guarantors of fulfilling of the 
agreements and contracts, but in reality they were masked un-
der the hired soldiers and “uncontrolled” bands. 
All this is the total deception aiming to muffle the main fac-
tors of the war of 1992-1993 and describe it as “the Patriotic 
War of the Abkhazia people against the Georgian agression”. 
Besides, they strive to deny the military participation of Russia 
and thus, rehabilitate their anti - Georgian policy. In the long 
run, the target of the expansion of such approach is splitting of 
Abkhazia from Georgia, its occupation and grounding of the 
military annexation ideology. 
Within the frame of the geopolitical and geostrategical re-
1.  Avidzba A. Patriotic war (1002-1003). Problems of military-polit-
ical history of Abkhazia, Sokhumi, 2008; Bgajba O.,Lacoba S. History 
of Abkhazia, Sokhumi, 2006; Mialo K.Russia and last wars of the 20th 
century,M.,2002; Pachulia V. Georgian–Abkhazian war of 1992-1993 
( warfare), Sokhumi, 2010. 
4sults of the August war, the prospect of returning of Abkhazia 
is problematic for us. It is the bitter and tragic reality. That’s 
why it is necessary to restore the objective picture of the mili-
tary participation of Russia in the war. It is determined by the 
strategic environment and transformation paradigm of the Ab-
khazian conflict. The existing situation and the scale of our loss, 
realization of the territorial crisis puts into the agenda the ne-
cessity of an adequate analysis of participation of Russia in the 
1992-1993 war. The contents and format of the analysis is to 
be full, logic, disinterested, free from the rules of play of con-
flictology and half-truth being sacrificed to the normalization 
of the relations with Russia. In short, 22-23 years after the war 
we must know, why Russia participated in the war, how it hap-
pened and what are the results. 
The aim of the present work is the analysis of the partic-
ipation process of Russia in the Abkhazian war of 1992-1993, 
the function of which is to make the military-strategic, recon-
naissance, political and diplomatic parameters of involvement 
of Russia in the war - subject of study and discussion. The po-
litical, geopolitical, geostrategic results are emphasized in the 
work and not only its chronical process. Besides, understanding 
of the militaristic, imperial and hegemonistic policy of Russia 
and destruction of its participation in the conflicts and its di-
rect and indirect mechanisms, as well as comprehension of the 
conflictogenic potential of Russia is of a paramount importance 
for the conceptual and doctrinal basis of planning of the future 
relations with that latter. 
5THE ROLE OF RUSSIA IN CREATING 
THE PRE-CONDITIONS IN THE ABKHAZIAN WAR
The analysis of the historical genesis and evolution of each 
stage of the “Abkhazian Crisis” leads us to the unilateral con-
clusion – that the main source of crisis was Russia and the ar-
tery feeding it was the Russian Imperial strategy. 
Starting from the 19th century of the 60-ies and activation of 
the arranegements for splitting the cultural integrity of Geor-
gian- Abkahazian and the russification of that latter from the 
80-ies, splitting zone of Gagra from the Governorate of Kutaisi 
in 1903-1904, permanent efforts of separating of Abkhazia from 
the canonic jurisdiction of the Georgian church, the imperial 
military policy of General Denikin and anti-Bolshevik govern-
ment of Kuban in 1918-1919; anti-Georgian arrangements of 
the Soviet regime in the Sphere of the status of Abkhazia in 
1921-1931; Anti-Georgian cultural – language policy of the 50-
80-ies of the 20th century; “Plan of Sitin” ( 1922); “project of 
the “ resort republic” ( 1945-1947); “Doctrine of Suslov” ( 1961); 
“Gatherings” of inspired by the reactive slogans of splitting of 
Abkhazia from Georgia in 1957, 1967, 1977-1978 and 1989 – 
here are the stages of “crisis of Abkhazia” or to speak metaphor-
ically the “gatherings” for gambling organized by Russia.2  
Russia always had an ardent desire of dictating its will and 
the rules of imperial game to Georgia; this aspiration does not 
lie only on the surface of the political position of B. Eltsin and 
activites of the general officers of P.Grachov, but is deeply bur-
ied in the imperial features of the nature of Russian Statehood; 
to be more exact imerialism and militarism are determined by 
the inner nature of Russian Empire and thus, has the imma-
nent character. From this aspect, the geopsychological factor 
is worth paying attention: Russian elite and the significant 
segment of the social opinion in the 90-ies of the 20th century 
2. Assays from the History of Georgia. Abkhazia. Tbilisi, 2007. 
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full-fledged State, with its legitimate status and the special re-
gional interests in the Caucasus. Russia cannot reconcile with 
this historical and geopolitical reality not only from the politi-
cal strategy aspect, but from the psychological point of view as 
well. All this gave the strong social support to the anti-Georgia 
militaristic policy of the Kremlin and by the way, inspired the 
great flow of the volunteer combatants hired during the Ab-
khazian war. 
The essential moment of Russia’s participation in 1992-1993 
Russian war is clear: at the turn of the 80-90- ies of the 20th 
century activation of the national - liberating movement in 
Georgia , transformation of the social situation and political or-
der towards the Stately independence orientation conditioned 
the regular aggravation of the “Abkhazia Crisis” being inspired 
by the imperial centre to the level, that the preamble and caus-
es of growing of the conflict into the war were obvious. 
On the one hand, the tendency of merging of the struggle 
for restoration of the national independence with the Western 
orientation of Georgia became obvious and on the other hand 
the illegal separatist movement of Abkhazia for splitting from 
Georgia merged with the Russia’s regional interests and policy 
of the Kremlin for obtaining its dominion in the South Caucasus. 
Collision of these two tendencies turned especially acute 
in 1991-1992 and at the background of the inevitable disinte-
gration of the Soviet Empire determined the following three 
factors: The lines of the development of the crisis of the po-
litical process in Abkhazia, position of the Georgian political 
elite in regard with Russia and negative attitude of the Rus-
sian authorities ( teams of Gorbachev and Eltsin) towards the 
legitimate steps of Georgia ( Elections of the 28th of October 
of 1990 and growing of the national movement into the State 
Power subject; Referendum of the 31st of March of 1991 and 
Declaration of the 9th of April on the restoration of the Stately 
7independence; Presidential elections of the 26th of May of 1991; 
Standing of Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s power on the platform of the 
full independence and refusal on participating in the so-called 
“Novo-Ogariovo Process”; Positive neutrality during the Mos-
cow putsch and so on). 
The opinion, that Russia did not have preliminary elabo-
rated reactive plans in Abkhazia, as well as imperialistic aspi-
rations, secret targets and the fact, that it had to transform its 
politics due to Georgian activites and deeds is a total nonsence. 
On the contrary, facts, separate examples, general direction of 
the Kremlin policy proves opposite: and it is, encouragement 
of Ardzinba’s grouping to escalate the conflict, and afterwards 
strengthening of the military potential of that latter during the 
war and military involvement.  
In conditions of the national-liberating movement of Georgia 
and the course of the sovereignization of the communist author-
ities of the country ( on the 9th of March of 1990 the Supreme 
council of the Georgian SSR passed a Declaration on “ the Sover-
eignty of Georgia” and a Resolution on the “ Guarantees of De-
fense of the Stately Sovereignty of Georgia” and the attitude of 
the Kremlin acquired the signs of the military –political strategy. 
It was the direct orientation towards the usage of the conflict 
inspiration tactics and the factor of the military force.  
At a certain stage the function of the presure was given to 
the “strategy of intimidation”. That strategy contained the pre-
ventive elements of the psychological impact on Zviad Gam-
sakhurdia and his national government, in order to intimidate 
them with the certain acts in case of declaring the Stately in-
dipendence and thus maintain paralyzation of the anti-imepe-
rial policy. One has only to recall Zviad Gamsakhurdia’s and 
Mikhail Gorbachov’s telephone conversations, when that latter 
was warning the President of Georgia about the complications 
in Sokhumi and Tskhinvali in case of choosing the course of 
independence. The Kremlin thought, that the strategic poten-
8tial of intimidation would appear a repressive background for 
Georgia. The psychological pressure had to be performed on 
the permanent basis and be universal; that latter had to create 
permanent strain and the condition of balancing on the conflict 
threshold (namely, that policy was called by Zviad Gamsakhu-
rdia in 1991 the course of the “total destabilization”). 
 The war between Russia and Georgia was inevitable due to 
the fulfilling of the idea of independence and performing of the 
policy of Sovereignty by Georgia and consequently, that war 
would be avoidable if Georgia would refuse to persue that idea 
and deny the performance of the adequate policy. The main 
factor is the factor of the inevitability of the war and not the 
place and time of its prosecution; it did not matter, whether it 
would take place in Tbilisi on the 22nd December of 1991, in 
Tskhinvali on the 6th of January of 1991 or on the 14th of August 
of 1992 in Sokhumi. 
In the same period the tactic element of the intimidation 
policy and integral strategic anti-Georgian project was demon-
stration of the power. On the territory of Abkhazia through the 
additional stationing of the military units the Kremlin created 
the situation for breaking the fragile balance and bringing into 
action the methods of escalation for stimulating the negative 
political changes.  
On the 22-23rd of February of 1991, without asking a per-
mission from the Central Power of Georgia, according to the 
directive given by the minister of Inner Affairs B.Pugo the 250 
men division with the full military equipment was brought into 
the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia3. Due 
to the fact, that the arrangement was made without the agree-
ment with the Central Power of Georgia and in addition it was 
in breach with the legislation of the USSR (as there was not a 
single case of not only mass but even sporadic disorderly con-
duct of the society), it has to be assessed as de facto intervention 
3. The Problem of Abkhazia in the official documents, V I., Tbilisi, 
1999, p. 58. 
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gion. With that act the status of Stately Sovereignty of Georgia 
and superiority of the territorial - legal jurisdiction in Abkhazia 
were ignored.  
Besides, it is obvious, that the step of the Kremlin was mo-
tivated by the provocative operative tasks. The division of the 
internal military forces was stationed in one of the health re-
sorts located in the village of Babushera of the Gulripsh dis-
trict. On the 20th of December of 1990 according to the law of 
the National Guard, from the second part of January of 1991 
in Georgia started the recruiting process and formation of the 
military units. Among the divisions formed in Abkhazia, one 
and namely the Gulripsh Batallion of the National Guard was 
stationed in one of the objects located on the Sea Coast of the 
village of Babushera, which was only in several hundred meters 
from the place of location of the Internal military forces. Thus, 
we may suppose, that the act of the Kremlin, besides the above 
mentioned function aimed at organizing the military provoca-
tion and inspiring of the local military strain through imitation 
of the restriction of functioning of the National Guard of the 
Gulripsh Battalion. 
 “The incident of Babushera” was a typical phenomenon for 
the strategy of realization of the imperialistic interests of the 
Kremlin. That strategy, as we have already mentioned above was 
directed towards the artificial destabilization of the situation in 
the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia, provoking of the mili-
tary crisis and dislocating of the escalation from the political line 
to the military line. 
Activation of the secret service and disruptive activities of 
the Kremlin was the consisting part of the same strategy. Seed-
ing of the agent net of the special service into the military sys-
tem of Georgia was of a paramount importance. The military 
councilors of the national guard of Georgia “Shavnabada” were 
Colonel of the State Intelligence Department - Al. Postishev 
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and Major “Sasha”. The latter was the officer of the Intelligence 
Department of the group of the Russian Military forces in the 
Trans Caucasus. During the Gagra battles (October 1992) he 
used to give the members of the Georgian Guards regiment 
such sort of military tasks and sent them to the places from 
which only few of them returned4. 
Later, Major “Sasha” became executive of the Chief of the 
regiment – A. Barbakadze. The fact that during the Tamish op-
eration ( July 1992), Barbakadze’s subdivision failed to defend 
the space between the Tamish bridge and farm and the landing 
force of the adversary managed to form a foothold there5, was 
the so-called “merit” of “Sasha”. 
On April 17 of 1991 on the territory of Tbilisi military set-
tlement, was held Major Postroiuk an officer of the special reg-
iment of the military district of the Trans Caucasus. At the time 
of arrest he was trying to persuade the soldier of the national 
guard to help them. As a result of interrogation it became clear 
that special subdivision was formed from the Russian-speak-
ing staff of the State Security Committee, for studying and in-
vestigating the processes having place there and data capturing 
of the needed information6. Work of the special regiment of 
the military district of the Trans Caucasus on the territory of 
Georgia with the aim of forming a conspiracy net of the secret 
service, gathering of the intelligence deliverables and handing 
it to the Imperial centre became especially active from Spring 
of 1991. The secret source informed the Minister of State Secu-
rity of Georgia O.Khatiashviil, that one of the residencies was 
formed in the village Krasnoe of the Marneuli district, by Major 
of Chief of the special department of the Marneuli Russian mil-
itary base, Major Of. Fursov7.
4. Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze, reference, p. 2.
5.  Personal archive of Colonel  G. Maisuradze, reference, p. 6.   
6. Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze, report 25.04.91,p. 1. 
7.  Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze,  reference  6.05.91, p. 
1-2.
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In February of the year of 1991 by the instruction of the 
State Secret Committee of the Soviet Union, at the level of the 
Trans Caucasus for the coordination of the Intelligence service 
- operative activities in the 4th sector of the special regiment 
of the military district of the Trans Caucasus, was formed the 
Intelligence service subdivision under the command of Colonel 
Tsurika. The nuclear consisting of 7-8 officers was in Tbilisi 
and its branches were in Baku and Yerevan. The subdivision 
consisted of Intelligence service and Operative-technical struc-
tural divisions. The tasks of the subdivision in Georgia was the 
following: Gathering of the operative information on the main 
directions of the political course of Z. Gamsakhurdia’s Govern-
ment ( for fulfilling this task it was necessary to search for the 
reliable sources in the Supreme Council, State Security Com-
mittee, organs of Militia, National Guard, oppositional parties); 
as well as gathering of the information on the plans and proba-
ble activities of the opposition; Restoration of the contacts with 
the “old” agents and formation of the “New” agents8. The whole 
complex of the arrangements being made within the regional 
policy of the imperial centre of the years of 1991-1992 served 
that aim. According to the results those arrangements can be 
divided into the three groups: 
The first group contains the political-legislative acts being 
passed by V. Ardzinba on suggestion of the Kremlin through vi-
olating the elementary norms of the legal consciousness. Essen-
tially, it was the Constitutional conflict with the Central Power 
of Georgia (the so-called “war of the laws’), which created the 
juridical basis for the future war. 
The second group contained the political steps (financial, po-
litical, psychological) being undertaken by Ardzinba’s environ-
ment through forming the pro-imperial party-political net in 
the Autonomous Republic and widening of the social-political 
base of the separatism ( “Slavic House”, Armenian “Krunk”, and 
separate “charity” groups and “cultural” societies; in March of 
8.  Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze,  reference 5.05.91 ,p. 1.
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1992 on the ground of coalition of those units with “Aidgilara” 
 was created anti-Georgian and pro -Moscow block “Soiuz”; 
Intense contacts with the “Confederation of the Highlanders 
of the Caucasus” being formed by the KGB grew into the fac-
tual military alliance. The Kremlin brought into the game the 
North Caucasian player and planted the bomb of destruction 
of the Iberian-Caucasian consciousness and ruining the idea of 
the integral Caucasus). Thus, created the political the basis for 
the future war. 
The third group contained the preliminary elaborated pro-
voking acts impeding normalization of the situation, the fur-
ther widening of the primary effect obtained through due to 
the efforts of the National Power of Georgia ( especially, after 
the compromise was achieved and the election law passed in 
Summer of the year of 1991). In accordance with the directives 
from the imperial centre, the Sokhumi separatist grouping sup-
ported the irresponsible activities of the destructive forces and 
purposively did not undertake steps towards restricting of the 
activities of the groups deepening the process of confrontation. 
That kind of policy caused the opposition in the Autonomous 
republic created the atmosphere of mistrust and ethnic con-
flicts and hindered the mechanisms of agreement, cooperation 
and stability. On the basis of all the above mentioned facts, al-
liance of the different circles of the Kremlin and Abkhazian 
separatists provided the societal basis for the oncoming war. 
All the three above mentioned directions of the destructive 
policy of the imperial centre was interrelated and interdepen-
dent. In the whole, their function is obvious – it is creation 
of anarchy in Abkhazia, disturbing of the initially fragile bal-
ance existing between Tbilisi and Sokhumi, formation of the 
real precondition of growing into the war ( in the secession 
war of the Abkhazia ethnocracy against the Central Power of 
Georgia). 
Failure of the Moscow Putsch of August of 1991 and replac-
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ing the Gorbachov team with the Eltsin team neither changed 
the attitude of Empire towards Georgia, nor threw the “Abkha-
zian card” into the dust-bin of history, but on the contrary, the 
new formation Russian elite established even stronger the an-
ti-Georgian alliance with the Abkhazian ethnocracy, refined 
and made more task-oriented the conflictogenic techonologies 
of initiating of the war. It is the core of the matter: when on the 
top level the radical transformation of the State hierarchy takes 
place, but the imperial policy and accompanying it technological 
strategies don’t change ( but, vice versa they obtains even more 
radical impulses), it means that imperialism, expansionism and 
interventionism are the inseparable law of the Russian policy. 
 On the one hand, the Putsch of August ( coup d’etat) (over-
throw of President Gorbachov by the group of putschists, tak-
ing power by the “ State Committee of the Special Situations” 
and announcement of the State of emergency) was the an-
ti-Constitutional State overturn. On the other hand, the acts 
of Belovezh Agreement on the 8th of December of 1991 and 
Declaration of Alma-Ata on the 21st of December of 1991 on 
the cease of existence of the USSR were logical and lawful. But, 
in relation to Georgia that transitory geopolitical process was 
not significant, as it was the circulation having place in the no-
menclature of the highest hierarchy of the Empire, replacing 
of the “Gorbachov centre” with the “Eltsin centre”, “replacing 
of the Novo-Ogariovo Process” and “project of the “Alliance 
of the Sovereign States (SSA) with the “Belovezh Process” and 
“project of the “Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 
Georgia stood on the platform of the complete independence: 
it assessed equally negatively the “Novo-Ogariovo Process” and 
“Belovezh Process” and refused to join the- neo imperialistic 
creation of the Kremlin – CIS. 
The position of that time West is worth attention. The west-
ern establishment of that period, in conditions of the split of the 
Soviet Union and bipolar structure of the world, was not inter-
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ested in dezintegration of the integral space and splitting of the 
integral model of security ( as the following events showed it 
was the strategic mistake of adminsitrations of G. Bush – Se-
nior and B. Clinton). Besides, West assessed the inner nature of 
transformation having place in Moscow very peculiarly: it esti-
mated it as a dichotomy of the totalitarism and democracy and 
viewed that approached integrally, as one whole of the internal 
and foreing policy of the Kremlin. In the internal policy Russia 
of B. Eltsin really had a certain degree of democracy ( though 
it remained a non-liberal country), but the foreign policy and 
especially towards the post –Soviet countries it maintained the 
role of the conductor of the imperial course and power politics. 
West failed to see the signs of that correlation, neither assessed 
the expansive strategy of the Kremlin adequately and nor with-
stood even formally the inner destabilization of the Post-Soviet 
countries and the destructive policy of the Kremlin directed 
towards the control of the conflict belt along the perimeter of 
the Russian border. It was the reason of the neutrality to say the 
least, in the Abkhazian war from the side of the West. 
The course of Georgia due to its geocivilization choice and 
non-participation in the CIS block formed under the patronage 
of Russia radically strained the relations between Moscow and 
Tbilisi in all the spheres. The Kremlin shifted into the stage of 
planning of the imperial projects and organization of the con-
trolled escalation in Abkhazia. It is rather significant, that a 
new wave of Russia’s activity coincided in time with the above 
mentioned course of Georgia; on the 15th of September of 1991 
the Supreme Council of Georgia passed a Declaration on an-
nouncing of the Soviet Army located on the territory of the 
Republic of Georgia an occupational military force. Simultane-
ously, by the order of President of Georgia, the Government of 
Georgia had to start the negotiations with the corresponding 
structures of the imperial venture on the deoccupation time 
and procedures, as well as on the topic of returning into pos-
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session of Georgia the objects and property of Russia located 
in the military district of the Trans Caucasus being located on 
the territory of our country. A Week earlier before passing of 
those acts, on the 9th of September was formed the Ministry of 
Defense of Georgia.  
Thus, Georgia univocally determined the priorities of the 
independent military policy, structures of the sovereign mili-
tary ruling ( in face of Ministry of the National Defense and its 
system-related organs), as well as the package of the political 
agreements and legal norms, on the basis of which the deocup-
pation of the country had to be made irrespective who would 
be in the Kremlin – Gorbachov or Eltsin.  
On the 21st of December of 1991 in Alma-Ata was held the 
Summit of the Leaders Allied Republics. The Summit had to 
decide the matter of joining of the different Post- Soviet Re-
publics to the Russia-Ukraine-Belorussia Belovezh Agreement 
made on the 8th of December of 1991 (on the disintegration of 
the Soviet Union and formation of CIS). This issue was decided 
by the special “Declaration”, not signed by Georgia the repre-
sentatives of which had the status of observers. Exactly, on the 
following day the State overturn started in Tbilisi.  
The reactive and interventionalist policy of Eltsin in con-
ditions of “democratic Russia” became more radical and un-
predictable,as it obtained a new dimension - the reoccupa-
tion-reanexation of the South Caucasus. The central thesis of 
that fundamental regional project was the restoration of the 
control over Georgia and the main military gear of its reali-
zation was the launching of the war in Abkhazia. Starting of 
the war in Abkhazia, its artificial protraction and provision of 
beneficial outcome with meddling into the war, was one of the 
main circles in the events conditioning the restoration of the 
close zone of Russian hegemony in the South Caucasus. Other 
circles of the chain were the war in Kharabagh, conflict in the 
Tskhinvali region, overthrow of A. Elchibei authority in Azer-
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baijan and organization of the overturn of the National Gov-
ernment of Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia.  
From the present position taking into conideration the ex-
isting material, decoded data, different memoire information 
and the inner logic of that time events arises no doubt, that: 
a) The putschist movement of September –Octo-
ber of the year of 1991, as well as the anti-Constitutional 
State overthrow of the 22nd of December - 6th of January 
of 1992 was performed with the political-diplomatic, fi-
nancial and military support of the Russian Federation;
b) The secret, informal committee being specially 
formed in the administration of President Eltsin head-
ed by the Vice-Premier and State Minister G. Burbulis 
managed and coordinated the Russian sources, forces and 
structures organizing the overthrow. 
c) The outcome of the Tbilisi Stately overthrow 
were beneficial for Russia and a new regional policy of 
the Kremlin, which was the following: overturn of the 
National Government of Zviad Gamsakhurdia, dissolu-
tion of the legitimate Supreme Council and dispension 
of the operating Constitution; formation of the illegiti-
mate and unpopular regime, first ( On the 2nd of January 
of 1992), the Military Council and then ( On the 10th of 
March of 1992,) the State Council headed by E. Shevard-
nadze, who returned from Russia; restoration in the Gov-
ernment of the Party nomenclature of the Soviet epoch; 
creation in Georgia of the controlled ( but, from time to 
time uncontrolled) chaotic atmosphere political crisis, 
civil confrontation;
d) Abkhazian separatists had the direct contacts 
with the “Committee of Burbulis”, Russian Generalship 
and special service circles. Separately from E. Shevard-
nadze’s anti - national “Moscow center” V. Ardzinba’s 
grouping on suggestion of the Kremlin and the directive 
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pressure of that latter played its separatist games. It was 
provision of the political, legal and military-administra-
tive basis for illegitimate separation of Abkhazia from 
Georgia, making growth of the Abkhazian crisis into the 
war inevitable. 
On the 29th of December of 1991 Presidium of the Higher 
Council of Abkhazia enacted a Regulation according to which 
the military divisions stationed on the territory of the Auton-
omous Republic ( army, internal troops, border troops and fa-
cilities of the military naval forces) fell within the jurisdiction 
of the Chairman of the Higher Council (i.e. V. Ardzinba), but 
their technique, armament and possession of the army institu-
tions ( facilities) were declared to be the property of Abkhazia.9 
This was the gross violation of the integrity of the Constitu-
tional system of Georgia by the separatist grouping and laws 
of the Supreme Council of Georgia from the 15th of September 
of 1991. The illegitimate efforts of accumulating of the mobi-
lization resources and controlling of the military system inde-
pendently from the Central Power were fixed. The adopted Act 
was the evidence of formation of the Russian10 military units 
and their stationing on the integral territory of Georgia. 
On the 29th December of the same year by the second Act 
V. Ardzinba formed under his guidance “The temporary mili-
tary council”, the function of which was “Coordidnation of the 
aactivities military and militia divisions11 being stationed on the 
territory of Abkhazia”. Head of the Council was V. Ardzinba, 
commanders of the Russian military units being stationed in 
Abkhazia – Colonel B. Miervelov, ( commander of the N3 697 
9. Regional Conflicts in Georgia - Autonomous District of the South 
Ossetia, ASSR of Abkhazia (1989- 2001). Collection of works of the 
Political-Legislative acts. Compiled and edited by T.Diasamidze. 
Tbilisi, 2002, p. 60-61. 
10. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was officially completed 
on December 25 of 1991, with the resign of President M. Gorbachev. 
11. Regional Conflicts…, p. 61. 
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of the military unit) and Mayor A. Klimov ( Commander of the 
Military Unit N 5482) became the members of the council. 
„The temporary military council” was in fact, the structure 
of separatist military control not subdued to the Central Power 
of Georgia, a sort of symbol for military-political Sovereignty 
of Abkhazia and Abkhazian-Russian military alliance. At the 
same time, as the following events revealed that organ of the 
future military system of the separatist regime played the part 
of the primordial image of the coordinating system of the sepa-
ratist regime and the so-called Ministry of Defense.  
It is obvious,that that the precise step of the military group-
ing of the separatists could not be undertaken without the sanc-
tion and support from Russia. It goes without saying, that the 
commanders of the Russian military divisions had never occu-
pied the places in the “council” without the directives from the 
Russian Headquarters, or the regional military main office. 
With the formation of the “temporary military council” the 
separatists sent an direct message to the auhtorites of Georgia 
implying that they did not exclude the armed confrontation ( 
the zero reaction from the paralyzed after the military overturn 
or Putch official Tbilisi is another problem). 
On March 31 of 1992 the circle of V. Ardzinba in the Pre-
sidium of the Higher Council passed a Resolution on “the Ar-
rangements concerning compliance with law on General mil-
itary obligation”.12 It was followed by the Resolution of the 
Council of Ministers of the Autonomous Republic (April 30) 
on the “recruiting of the citizens born in 1965-1974 into the 
real military service.”13 On the basis of that unlawful activity, 
in the non –Georgian part of the population of the Autonomous 
Republic due to the intense work of the military-mobilizing 
departments was formed “The internal household regiment”. 
In fact, it was a monoethnic guard – independent from the cen-
tral military structures of Georgia, a military unit subdued to 
12. Regional Conflicts…, p. 66-67.
13. Regional Conflicts…, p. 67. 
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the Head of the Higher Council of Abkhazia. It is remarkable, 
that the Russian subdivisions stationed on the territory of Ab-
khazia immediately started supplying the Abkhazian regiment 
with the military technique and weapon. It happened, when 
the Russian divisions stationed in other parts of Georgia resist-
ed the same analogous, though lawful deed for the Ministry of 
defense of Georgia; they named as a motive non-existence of an 
Agreement on the above mentioned matter with Georgia (It is 
well-known, that the Agreement was signed on May 15 1992 
in Tashkent). 
In Summer of 1992 the political strain reached the Apo-
gee. On the basis of regrouping of the ethnic communities and 
social-political forces qualitatively new political order was 
formed. The degree of conflictogenity and escalation reached 
the highest level. The policy of V. Ardzinba being encouraged 
from Russia and directed towards the usurpation of the Power of 
the Autonomous Republic and formation of an anti-Georgian, 
neototalitarian regime was introducing the situation into the 
dead end. On June 5 of 1992 in Sokhumi the extended meeting 
of the political organizations of the separatist orientation was 
called. At the meeting was announced, the so-called creation 
of the “National Committee of Saving Abkhazia”. Worth atten-
tion is the “Declaration of the National Committee of Saving of 
Abkhazia” adopted at the meeting, with its anti - Georgian pa-
thetic and proclaimity to forceful way out from the critical sit-
uation (i.e. via a war). Videlicet, in the Declaration is marked, 
that “…in case of formation of the anti-Constitutional parallel 
structures and the illegal military formations, it is necessary to 
undertake the following steps: nation-wide mobilization; send-
ing the analogous request on national-wide mobilization to the 
Parliament of the Confederation of the Highlanders of the Cau-
casus; immediate adoption of the Stately Independence Act of 
Abkhazia…”14 
14. Avidzba A. Patriotic War (1992-1993). Problems of Military-Po-
litical history of Abkhazia. Sokhumi, 2008, p. 72. 
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It is not difficult to infer, who is implied in the “declaration” 
in the “non-Constitutional parallel structures” and in “ illegal 
military formations”. Here are meant the anti-Separatist repre-
sentational structures - Parliamentary group “Democratic Ab-
khazia”, “Council of National Union” and the defense regiment 
in the subordinate to the Georgian State – the motorized bat-
talion of the Internal military forces of Sokhumi. “Declaration 
directly and openly demands announcement of “Independence” 
and launches the war for defense of that “independence”. This is 
how the Abkhazians took the rout of the factual military maneu-
ver tactics and with the help of Russia created basis for the war. 
We have already mentioned above the regional geopolitical 
strategy of Russia. The main element of the above-named proj-
ect was the Geostrategic plan elaborated by the administration 
of Boris Eltsin. The purpose of that latter was providing of the 
long-term military presence of the various strategic points on 
the territory of Georgia through creating of the net – military 
base, special militarized centers, peaceful missions. Speculation 
of the Kremlin was the following – organization of the new 
geostrategic architecture in the South Caucasus, exercise of the 
territorial expansion against Georgia via the war in Abkhazia 
and involvement of the country into the outer buffer belt of 
the Imperial geospace ( together with Azerbaijan and Moldo-
va). Wasn’t the entrance of the Russian Peacemaking Mission 
into Georgia in accordance with the Agreement after the war 
in Abkhazia on May 14 of 1994 the strategic points destined for 
the security and limited armament zones for its jurisdiction? 
Beofre the war the inflience of Russia on the political factors 
of the “Abkhazian crisis”and the configuration of forces was 
charachterized with a certain peculiaruty. In the Kremlin ( at 
least in that part of the Kremlin elite, which represented Pres-
ident Eltsin’s surroundings and ruling group) was decided,that 
at that stage the proAbkhazian course did not correspond to the 
imperial ineterest of growing the crisis into the war. Thus, the 
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course was held for the tactics of encouraging the both sides to 
launch a war. In June-July of 1992 the Kremlin chose the tactics 
of guaranteeing the both sides - the Georgian and Abkhazian 
and started working in the parallel regime. 
On June 18 of 1992, from the military-engineering divi-
sion of the Russian Army stationed in the district of “Maiak” 
in Sokhumi with the purpose of armament of the so-called Ab-
kahzian guard was given out great amounts of automatic weap-
on, machine-guns and other military techniques15. 
On June 24 of 1992 at the meeting of E. Shevardnadze and 
B. Eltsin in Dagomis bisides the principles of regulating the 
Georgian –Ossetian conflict, the whole complex of relations be-
tween Georgia and Russia was discussed. In the “Communiqué” 
was said: “The organs of legal order of Georgia and Russia will 
suppress and terminate on the territory under their jurisdiction 
activities of the illegal military, half military and arbitrarily 
formed divisions and groups.”16 Official Tbilisi called “the ille-
gitimate military and half military detachments” the devoted to 
the President Zviad Gamsakhurdia National Guard functioning 
on the territory of West Georgia and other military groups. The 
majority of them moved to Abkhazia. The monotonic guard 
and armed groups of “Aidgilara” were also considered to be the 
“illegal detachments». 
On June 24 of 1992, the very day of singing the “Dagomis 
Communiqué” by the order of V. Ardzinba that guard as if 
“protecting the public order” occupied the building so of the 
15.  Personal archive of Colonel G. MAisuradze, reference 30. 06. 
92,p.9.
16.  The problem of return of E. Shevardnadze to Georgia and Es-
tablishment of his regime   was finally decided on March 2 of 1992 
within the frames of secret negotiations being held in Moscow (She-
vardnadze-Shaposhnikov, Shevardnadze – Primakov, Sehvardnadze 
– Lukin, and Shevardnadze – Kitovani).  In exchange for the guar-
antees Shevardnadze had to fulfill two stipulations – becoming the 
member of CIS and restoration of the status of the Russian Army in 
Georgia. 
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Supreme Council and Council of Ministers, took control of the 
central highway of Sokhumi, streets and squares. The coinci-
dence was not accidental. 
 It is not a secret, that at the Dagomis meeting E. Shevard-
nadze received a sanction from B. Eltsin on conducting military 
operation in Abkhazia guaranteeing Russia’s neutrality. 
On July 18 of 1992 in Sochi, at the State villa of “Bocharov 
Ruchei” Boris Eltsin held a secret non official meeting with 
V. Ardzinbda and other repsresenatative sof the Abkahzian 
elite.”17 In five days after the meeting on July 23, the Supreme 
Council ofAbkhazia passed series of illegallegislative acts of the 
separatist character18 : resolution on the changes to be made in 
the regualtions ( which was the offense against the principles of 
the Constitutionalism and the Constitution of the Autonomous 
Republic, as it stated,a s a quorum for changes to be made in 
the Constitution not the qualified majority, but simple major-
ity og votes); It was the Resolution on cessation of operation 
of the Constitution of the year of 1978 and till adoption of the 
new Constitution on operating the Constitution of the SSR of 
Abkhazia of the year of 1925 (It implied cessation of the State - 
Legal relations with Georgia; In the Resolution simultaneously 
with the restoring of the Constitution of the year of 1925 was 
marked, that “ the operating system of the legislative, executive 
and court power was to be maintained.” (I.e. on the basis of the 
Constitution of 1978 -D.J.).
As it known, reglamentation of the legislative, executive 
and court system in the backbone of every constitution, the nu-
clear of it. So, what? The Constitution of the year of 1978 was 
officially removed and the Constitution of the year of 1925 was 
to be operated, but in reality in operation was still the Consti-
tution of 1978, but without the status of the Autonomous Re-
public. The stillborn Constitution of April 1 of 1925, which was 
not even published and had never been operated, was needed 
17.  Lacoba S.    Abkhazia de facto or Georgia de-jure. M., 2001, p. 25.
18. Newspaper, “republic of Abkhazia”, June 27 of 1992.   
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by the separatists only because of one article – the sovereignty 
of Abkhazia); laws on the change of the name and symbolic of 
the Autonomous Republic; Law on the transit taxes ( Which 
considered to be the possession of Abkhazia the territory of the 
Republic, its air and sea space; one of the items of the 4th arti-
cle – “ legal and physical persons of Republic of Georgia and 
Krasnodar District are exempt from transit taxes” – regarded 
Georgia, as legally outer territory and it was equaled with the 
Krasnodar District belonging to Russian Federation). 
Thus, after the confidential meeting with the President 
of Russia and in accordance with the received directives and 
guaratnees, on July 23 of 1992 the separatist groupings revolu-
tionized the regional political overthrow and declared the de-
sire of anti-Constitutional split of Abkhazia form Georgia or the 
illegal cessation. 
It is how the separatist elite suppoerted by Russia and spe-
cifically V. Ardzinba led the situtaion to the military opposi-
tion. Self-Confession of V. Ardzinbda made at the beginning of 
August while conversing with Professor S. Chrvonnaia is symp-
tomatic is this respect:” We are ready for this, we can place 
under arms. 
 “We are ready and in a half an hour are able to call up 
for military service the whole population. Our armory is full 
of Russian weapon and at any moment we can get two times, 
three times more. We established contacts with the Kazaks. 
Soon a war will break out here and not only the Caucasus, but 
the whole Russia will be involved.”19 
The political participation of Russia shut out the possibility 
of reviving of the trust in Abkhazia between the tow sides and 
swithing on of the mechanism of the coordination, compromise 
and cooperation in the critical situation ( at leat the compulsory 
cooeprtaion). Even the more, Russia had a wide-scale influence 
on Tbilisi and Sokhumi and it could easily restore the stability 
through forcing the both sides to sit at the table of negotiations 
19. Newspaper, “republic of Abkhazia”, July 28 of 1992.   
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and return even to the lawmaking discussion ( “The war of leg-
islations”). But the Kremlin did not make it; it did not exploit 
the methods of diplomatic pressure and other political chan-
nels. It even did not make an effort to create the environment 
of alternative offerings and de-escalation for the opposed sides. 
Involvment of Russia and tactics of double guarantee ruined 
the integrity of the political process and destroued the basis for 
the de-escalation of the conflict.Russia preferred to pretende 
not to interfere and support the peaceful solution and wait to 
the break of the war and the moment to get involved. 
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THE WAR OF THE YEARS OF 1992-1993 IN 
ABKHAZIA: CONJUNCTURE OF RUSSIA’S 
INVOLVEMENT AND TEXTURE FOR THE 
PARTICIPATION
 
The starting point of the regular armed intervention of Rus-
sia became August 14 of 1992: It was the day, when the tactic 
grouping consisting of the subdivision of the Internal forces, 
formations of the Minsitry of Defense and the militarized guard 
of the Railway Department moved to the territory of Abkhazia. 
The basis for the restationing was the resolution adopted on Au-
gust 10 of 1992 on introduction of the special rules of the rail-
way transportation means and the special plan being prepared 
by the operative department of the Headquarters of the Min-
istry of Defense ( with the code name “Makhvili” ( “Edge”). V. 
Ardzinba was warned about the operation of the 14th of August. 
At the village Okhurei of the Ochmachire District the group of 
Abkhazian boeviks (gunmen) opened fire to the armed convoy 
of the limited contingent, followed by the first casualties. Near 
the village Agudzera of Gulripsh District a serious battle had 
place (the so-called “special regiment of the Internal Military 
Forces of Abkhazia” opened fire to the Georgian column and 
blew up on armored vehicle in the vicinity of the Airport Ba-
bushera and “the red bridge” located near Sokhumi, It was the 
start of the “War in Abkhazia” of 1992- 1993, or essential the 
regular Russo-Georgian war. 
Movements of the army contingent on the territory of the 
Autonomous Republic having palce on official mdecision of the 
authorities of Georgia, was not an intervention or occupational 
act. The armed forces of the State were moving within the inte-
gral territorial-Stately space and sovereign jurisdiction. From the 
formal-juridical and military-normative aspect this act can be 
qualified as movement of armed forces and restationing having 
place on the basis of the supremacy of the State territory. An-
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other issue is the relation of the act of August 14 to the factors of 
values, humanity and conflict, as well as to the cultural motives 
of historical cohabitation of Georgian and Abkhazians. Those 
factors and motivations in certain, special situations acquire the 
degree of conditionality, especially when national interests and 
paradigm of the territorial integrity suggests the necessity of 
power politics. 
On August 14 the official Tbilisi made a bad decision,not to 
pay attention to the decision made by the Kremlin and sepratsit 
groupings. We mean the legislative norms and the elementary 
rules on which stands the order of Constitution. From the as-
pect of positive legislation the act of 14th of August can be as-
sessed as a certain sort of inner Stately reprisal, as a certain type 
of a military sanction. It was the extreme and compulsory mea-
sure being undertaken by the Central Government of Georgia 
in reply to the illegal action ( non-Constitutional Resolution 
made in July 23) of the authorities of the Autonomous Repub-
lic and with the purpose of avoiding the outcome of that act ( 
cession and threatening the territorial integrity of the country). 
Reduced explanation of the causes for the military opera-
tion of the 14th of August made within the subjective frames 
is abosultely uneccaptable ( as well as the causes for launching 
the war in 1992-1993) . The essence of the subjective opinion 
is the fact, that the reason for starting the war is named the 
personal mistakes of the politicians and military commanders. 
And their unrealized actions and non-pragmatic steps. For ex-
ample, E. Shevardnadze’s refusal to arrive in to Sokhumi for 
the face-to-face negotiations with V. Ardzinba and the self-ini-
tiative of the Minister of Defense T. Kitovani are named as the 
reasons. Laying the blame of the reasons for launching the war 
upon the Georgia political elite does not stand any criticism. 
Unfortunately, the authors of the like versions do not realize, 
that willing or not are trapped into the conceptual net of the 
hiding of the crucial role of Russia. Laying all the blame on E. 
Shevardnadze and T. Kitovani is approved with the fact, that 
27
Russia waives the main responsibility for the genesis of the war 
and eve the more – factually neutralizes the imperial factors of 
the origin of the war. 
On August 15 of of 1992 the Georgian sea-born assault 
military forces landed in the village Gandiati of Gagra zone. 
It established control in the Gantiadi-Leselidze zone and State 
board on the River Psou. Afterwards, after the four-day battles 
with the Abkhazian military formations the Georgian sea-born 
assault forces moved to Gagra and occupied the main part of the 
District of Gagra including a very important Gagra range. 
Durign 14-17 of August the Georgian divisions were stopped 
at the river Kelasuri and entered Sokhumi only on August 18. 
During that period the grouping of V. Ardzinba and the or-
gans of the separatist authorities moved to Gudauta; as for the 
military formations they stationed on the river Gumista and 
formed a Gumista (western) front. Later, the second strategic 
line of opposition was formed in the Ochamchire district, the 
so-called Eastern front. 
Concerning the war20 of 1992-1993 we have a quite solid book 
and analytical production. The war in its complexity (starting 
with the military operations and ending with the analysis of the 
“military diplomacy”), as well as it’s thematically and chronolog-
ical aspects. We will be dealing with one specific problem and it 
is the participation of Russia in the war, its fundamental impact 
on the dynamics of the military operations, evolution of the mili-
tary-strategic situation and determination of the war outcome and 
on the general process of the Georgian-Russian military political 
relations. Our research besides the impartiality and objectivity is 
based on the functional approach: The main thing is to explain 
involvement of Russia from the negative role it played in the out-
come of the war of 1992 - 1993. 
 Thus, analyses are focused on the structural factors of med-
dling of Russia, factual data, about their decisive role in deter-
20. Chervonnaia S. Abkhazia 1992: Postcommunist Vandea of Geor-
gia. M., 1993, p. 125. 
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mining the cosequences of the war. And about the definition 
of involvemtn of Russia ( Gression, indirect intervension and 
hybrid war. The military-strategic and political aspects are re-
viewd as one integral part. 
For the beginning of th war on the territory of Abkhazia 
were stationed two mechanized divisions of the Ministry of 
defense, squadron of the military air forces (air force division 
529), დრილია, the special missile division N 643, the divisions 
of the beach defense of the district of the red warf of the of 
the town of Sokhumi and the town of Ochamchire, military 
divisions N 5482 and 3697, the so-called department N 901, 
the military-seismic laboratory of Esher, as well as the subdi-
vision of the communication and logistic services and groups 
of support. All those divisions were united in a special corpus 
– “the group of Russian Army in Abkhazia”. Its headquarters in 
decision the separate matters and problems were less and less 
dependent on the Tbilisi Commandment of the Russian Army 
group in the Trans Caucasus and communicated with the Min-
istry of Defense of Russia directly and the chief commandment 
of the different specialization army through the operative line. 
On the basis of the directives being received from Moscow, the 
headquarters of Russian army group in Abkhazia, worked out 
the plan of action for the case, the usage of the Russian army 
would be necessary for restoring and protecting social order. 
General Chindarov said in one of the interviews being given at 
that period:” We are not taking part in the military operations, 
but existing of the groups of the Russian army is necessary and 
correct. Why? Because, it is the restricting and restraining fac-
tor for the sharp politicians the Georgian side in the first place21. 
21. Abkhazian Labyrinth.Tbilisi, 1999. Gamakharia J. Policy of Zviad 
Gamsakhurdia in Abkhazia ( 1990 – 1993), Tbilisi., 2004; Kvaratskhe-
lia B. Undeclared War of  Russia against Georgia and the Internation-
al  Community, Tbilisi, 2015; Nadareishvili T. Plot against Georgia. 
Tbilisi, 2000; Essays from the History of Georgia – Abkhazia, Tbilisi, 
2007; Papaskiri Z. Essays from the Historical Past of Modern Abkha-
zia. Excerpt II. 1917-1993. Tbilisi, 2007; Jojua D.  Fall of Sokhumi. 
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The Commandment of the group of the Russian army in 
Abkhazia became the mechanism of separatist formation and 
management of the divisions of the Highlanders of the Cau-
casus, the centre for the operatiove and tactic planning. The 
military units stationed on the territory of Abkhazia supported 
V. Ardzinba’s grouping. The administrations of the districts of 
Krasnodar and Stavtropol also shifted to the regime of the like 
solidarity, mobilization, economic and military-technical sup-
port. The acted under the false label of the President B. Eltsin’s 
“Economic Aid” declared on the 29th of March of 1992. From 
time to time the analogous steps were undertaken by the district 
and local management levels of Russia. On the 20th of August of 
1992 the meeting of the leaders of the North Caucasian Repub-
lics, Rostov District, and Stavropol and Krasnodar regions was 
held in the town of Armavir. The “Armavir meeting” required 
the direct and complex involvement of Russia in to the conflict 
having started on the 14th of August, which was recorded in the 
appeal of the participants to President Eltsin.”22 
From the existing situation and war format, configuration 
of the military forces and civil opposition and taking into con-
sideration of the factual potential of weakened Georgia , due 
to the above mentioned factors. The military strategy of Russia 
did no cover the direct, large-scale intervention with the com-
plex military forces and operative-tactic groupings. The chron-
ic stately and social-economic crisis having place in Georgia, 
factual ruin of the inner national agreement and social inte-
gration, non protection of the norms defense and security poli-
cy, the hardest moral and psychological climate and the degree 
of fighting abilities. The structural difficulties of the military 
constructin ( dominant tendency of the paramilitarism , com-
plicating the transformation of the “brotherhoods” “ individual 
battalions and half military formations into the regular and dis-
ciplined mechanism). The plethora of all those factors condi-
Tbilisi, 2014; Papaskiri Z. History without Falsification. Tbilisi, 2010. 
22. Nadareishvili T. Plot against Georgia, Tbilisi, 2000, p. 56. 
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tioned a priori the weakness of Georgia and military-strategic 
imbalance in comparison with the opposite forces. Thus, the 
realization of the Russian interests was not in need of large-
scale intervention. The restrained and optimized regime turned 
to be enough which due to the limitation and discretion, was 
not observable on the surface and had the non formal and non 
official character. Russia simultaneously always had the divi-
sions of the operative invasion and tactic groups; it also used 
the tactics of paratroopers. Ths strategy of the Kremlin took 
into consideration multivariant amd complex scenario of ex-
poitation of the military forces, among them the plans of mass 
air invasions on the strategic objects located on the territory of 
Tbilisi and the territory of Georgia. It is widely known, that for 
example the telephone conversation of vice-president of Russia 
A. Rutskoi with E. Shevardnadze during which he repeatedly 
threatened him to bomb the capital of Georgia. 
On the very first day of the outbreak of the war on August 
14 the military groupings of Abkhazia envaded Gudauta and 
entered the territory where the 643 air defense military system 
of Russia was stationed and took possession of 984 machine-ri-
fles , 270 guns, 18 machine –guns,600 sygnal rockets, more than 
500 granades, and more than half a million of different caliber 
shells. They robbed all the buildings of the garrison town and 
captured the vehicle technique, and all the possessions of the 
goods and food warehouses, as well as chemical and engineer-
ing service goods.23 As it was became clear later, that “invasion” 
and “capturing” was an action being preliminary settled with 
the commandment of the Russian military divisions. Consul-
tant of V. Ardzinba, in the matters of special services of Russia 
M. Demianov confirmed, that military armament of the 643 ze-
nith-rocket division, military-engineering technique and auto-
mobile park was given to the Abkhazians and this handing over 
was masked under the “invasion” and “capturing”. 
23. Abkhazian Labyrinth,   p. 208. 
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Accordign to the data given by the same M. Demianov, one 
of the centres of purchasing of the weapons and transportation 
for the Abkhaia formations as the headquarters of the Onega 
marine fleet. The Abkhazian used to purchase the arms in Pri-
ozerie through former commander of the Onega fleet of the 
marine forces of Russia – I.Kolesnikov. The purchased weapon 
and special extra - power explosive material was transported 
with the”Sovtranssovet” cars made in Saint-Petersburg24.
The commandment of the 529 division of the air-forces of 
Russia also took part in formatkon of the military arsenal of 
the separatists.The head of the technical supply of he Bombo-
ra military airport - lieutenant-colonel A. Dolgopolov handed 
to the Abkhazian side 6 military cars for the troops ( the so-
called “BMP”) equipped with the full military complex, 6 ma-
chine-guns, 367 grenades “f -1” and more than 50 000 different 
caliber shells.25
On August 16 of 1992. From the Azerbaijanian town Ganja to 
Gudauta were repositioned the 1 500 men parachute regiment N 
345 of the airborne forces and transported 122 troop-carrying ve-
hicles, 13 anti – aircraft vehicles and 18 mm automotive artillery 
equipment.26 The official version of stationing of the regiment in 
Georgia was defense of the objects of the Ministry of Defense of 
Russia located in the conflict zone of Abkhazia and evacuation of 
the Russian citizens from the resorts. But in reality stationing of 
the regiment N345 was purposeful. Firstly, N901 landing battal-
ion was already there and it had an official order to defend the 
military objects and net of the resorts ( and it really was defend-
ing those objects); secondly, regiment N901 was a structure of a 
special purpose and strategic importance and videlicet the battal-
ion N345 together with the special groups of KGB – “Grom” and 
“Zenith” participated in launching the war in Afghanistan on 
24. Crucified Georgia   1998, p. 162.
25. Nadareishvili T. Plot…, p.56.  
26. Chachanidze T. Russian Army in the inner conflict of Georgia. 
J “Arsenal”, N15, 2008, p. 51.   
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December of 1979 - it was occupying of the residence of Presi-
dent H.Amin and a especial operation of his physical liquidation. 
Stationing of the above mentioned regiments in Georgia 
and especially in the conflict zone being controlled by the sep-
aratists is remarkable from the interventionalism and pro-Ab-
khazian aspect of participation in the war. 
One battalion of the regiment N 345 was stationed in the 
Bombora airport, the second on the territory of the zenyth- 
rocket regiemnt and the two hundred people devision on the 
territory of the military –seismic laboratory N24 of Qvemo ( 
lower) Eshera. 
As for the support of the military air - forces pf the sepa-
ratist by Russia, squadron of the avia regiment N529 station on 
the territory of the Bombora airport defended Gudauta-Akhali 
Atoni zone. In a forthright after starting the war, on September 
1 of 1992 the Cy 25 type of military planes of the regiment of 
air - forces N 186 joined others. Afterwards, they were used for 
bombing of the positions of Georgian units with the half ton 
bombs and a number of rocket shells. From November of 1992 
the bomber squadron of the first military air-forces of the Mos-
cow District under the commandment of Colonel Kovalenko 
participated in the war on the side of the separatists27. 
That unit was stationed in Gudauta till 1993 and it was pre-
ventatively attacking the positions of the Georgian army. The 
air war tactics performed by the squadron is worth a special 
interest; Russian sources also point to that fact and it makes 
obvious extremely unconventional and anti-humanistic nature 
of the Russian military forces: The bombers of the type “SU 25” 
avoided the front line, to minimize the risk coming from the 
Georgian zenith artillery and shelled the unmanagened missiles 
from the far trajectory28. It goes without saying, that in such 
27. Zhirokhov M. Delta planes against the tanks. www. Artofur.ru/z/
zhirohow-m_/text_0160-1.shtml/
28. Koshkin A. battle-plane   http://cyxymu.livejornal.com/1230936.
html
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cases were destroyed the peaceful population and civil objects 
and not the army positions and other military points. 
In February of 1993 the landing –operational group was 
transported to reconnaissance information and train of the Ab-
khazian formations. By the order of the Chief of the Gudau-
ta Russian military base, general A. Chandirov, the process of 
the military training of the Abkhazians was commanded by M. 
Skrinnikov29. In March of 1993 the squadron of Colonel Kova-
lenko was returned to the permanent place of stationing to 
the Moscow District and instead of the squadron “Su 25” type 
squadron circle from the Krasnodar Region was used to support 
the main air forces functioning in Abkhazia under the com-
mand of Colonel Riabinov30. Notorious Major V. Shipko was 
the member of that group. 
The main air force unit in the anti - Georgia war was the 
squadron of “Su25” type bombers under the command of Ma-
jor A. Koshkin. It was the unit of the North Caucasus Mili-
tary District air forces (videlicet, of the fourth air force army), 
which was moved from Mozdok to Gudauta in January of 1993. 
As Major Koshkin remarks, the regrouping and Bombora sta-
tioning operation was commanded by the commanders of the 
North Caucasus Military District - General Mikhailov and dep-
uty commander in chief of the landing forces of Russia - general 
Soroka.31 
Namely, that squadron was functioning in Abkhazia in Jan-
uary-September of 1993 and was on the air warfare with Geor-
gia: it was bombing the front positions of the Georgian army 
and the zones of reserve stationing, points of strategic signifi-
cance and communications, as well as the districts of dwelling 
of peaceful population and objects of the civil infrastructure. 
At the initial stage of the was the armed forces of Russia 
29.  Personal archive of Colonel  G. Maisuradze, reference, p.4.




formed two operative districts: The first to station were the 
air defense complexes “BUK”,guaranteeing the air defense of 
Gudauta-Axali Atoni zone, as well as of V. Ardzinba’s resi-
dence, points of ceoncentration of separatists and security other 
strategic objects; the second to station were the mobile zenyth 
rocket complexes of “OCA” on the Eshera-Gumista line, the 
main function of which were zenyth defence of the separatist 
formation of the Gumista front and blocking of the advance of 
the Georgian formations to the Eshera backbone. 
The operative group of the Russian air Forces was com-
manded by the Executive of the fourth army of the Russian 
military-Air Forces - General Tinditnikov. 
On August 29 of 1992 the tactic grouping of the Georgian 
divisions (600 soldiers, 3 tanks, and 6 armored vehicles) crossed 
the river Gumista and broke through the defense line of the 
enemy. They occupied village Achandara and several strategic 
heights on the Eshera backbone and an attack was launched 
to the of Axali Atoni-Gudauta direction. But, the attack of the 
Georgian military forces was blocked because of the Bombo-
ra air-group attacks and resistance of the battalion of regiment 
N345 located in the laboratory of Eshera. It was followed with 
a lot of ration of fatality and videlicet: 40 dead, 150 wounded, 3 
tanks and 4 armored vehicle destroyed. After the operation the 
Abkhazians managed to stabilize the defense line on the river 
Gumista and open there a front. 
On August 29 had place the first direct shelling between 
Georgia and Russia - a two-way military format clash, without 
the Abkhazians and Confederates. The main outcome of the 
clash was stabilization of the main operational pivot point of 
the war of the years 1992-1993 – stationed on the river Gumista 
and it was managed to achieve only with the help of the Rus-
sian militaries. 
 A lot of conventional documents concern aggression, as the 
delict deeds directed towards the fundamental values, princi-
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ples and norms of the functioning of the international system, 
but the international-legal definition of the notion of Aggres-
sion is specially emphasized in the Resolution of the General 
Assembly of UNDP of the year of 1974. The Resolution accen-
tuates the main 5 marks of those criminal deeds: 
1. Armed attack of one State into the territory of another; 
or the military occupation, even temporary, as the result of the 
above mentioned attack or invasion; or annexation with the use 
of the force’ 
2.  Bombing of the territory of another State by one State 
and exploiting of any forms of weapon; 
3. Blockage of ports and seashore- lines; 
4. Attack of one State on another State’s land, air and sea 
forces; 
5. Sending by the State on its behalf into the territory of 
another State of the armed groupings, irregular forces and/or 
volunteer divisions; 
In spite of the fact, that participation in the Abkhazian war 
of the Russian regular army divisions was not officially recog-
nized ( factually it was, but was not recorded formally and le-
gally) and we cannot apply the first point of the definition of 
aggression to the deeds of Russia ( from the normative aspect), 
that deed fully meets the rest four points. Thus, in the war of 
the years of 1992 - 1993 Russia was the aggressor country fight-
ing against Georgia, and the proof of it is the following: block-
age of the military operations of Georgia with the help of the 
land troops; Bombing of the positions of the Georgian army by 
the military –air and military-sea forces; Bombing of the dis-
tricts populated with the ethnical Georgians; Blockade of the 
Black-Sea coast and Ochamchire-Gagra harbor; Staffing of the 
irregular forces and volunteer divisions and sending them into 
the conflict zone; managing of that process, financial and trans-
port-technical provision etc. 
Thus, the military intervention of Russia into the war of the 
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years of 1992-1993 against Georgia had the form and spirit of 
aggression. Therefore, our national historiography and in gen-
eral for our social consciousness specification of the main di-
rections of the aggression, allocation of the priorities, showing 
of the military-strategic and political –economical diplomatic 
dynamics of the aggressive blows performed against Georgia. In 
short, strategic attribution, systematization and classification of 
military intervention of Russia are badly needed. 
From the strategic –attribution aspect we have to mark, 
that the military intervention into the post Soviet space is the 
common imperial tool of the Kremlin and at the same time, 
the component of the expansionist regional policy in the South 
Caucasus. 
As for the systematization-classification of the Russian 
aggression, here we can single out several typological forms, 
which later form the conception of the hybrid war. 
Structurally participation of Russia contains the following 
components: 
1) As it has been mentioned above, participation of the 
regular divisions of the armed forces of Russia in the war; 
these are – a special mission subdivision of Pskov, paratroopers 
N 345, zenith-rocket regiment N 643, landing force battalion 
N901, air-group consisting of the squadrons of the regiments N 
529 and N186, military ships of the Black Sea fleet. These are 
at least six large military units of army and fleet of Russia, the 
participation of which in the military operations conducted in 
the 27-30 km operational depth was proved. 
2) Irregular provision with the armament, technique and 
other materials of the Abkhazian separatists and the military 
groupings, being in alliance with that latter, as well as with the 
means of military transportation and military communications. 
It is well-known, that from that aspect the Moscow corporation 
“Caucasus” was especially active, as well as its active collabora-
tor General-Major P.Leshchuk. That latter was in touch with 
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the Russian army and upper circles of the military-manufac-
turing complex and one of the chief of the departments of the 
Ministry of Inner Affairs – General-Major A. Chulkov ( The 
former minister of Internal affairs of the Abkhazian ASSR). P. 
Leshchuk connected V. Ardzinba with the Russian Generality 
in the military staff hotel located in the “Leninskie Gori”, in 
Moscow32. 
3) Mobilization, staffing and deploying into the conflict 
zone of the irregular volunteer groups being hired on the ter-
ritory of Russian Federation by means of concentration points, 
military-educational camps and weapon depots. In the build-
ing of the Internal affairs of the town of Sochi functioned the 
representation of the Internal Affairs of Abkhazia under the 
command of Miron Agrba and the so-called representation 
of administration of Abkhazia under the command of Nodar 
Shamba. These structures were mainly busy with the recruiting 
of the mercenaries or hired guns33. 
4) Supplying of the Russian –Abkhazian –Confederate co-
alition forces with the means of support area;
5) Providing with the direct aid of the separatist regime in 
formation of the institutional system and ethno centrist mili-
tary dictatorship on the territories beyond the control of Geor-
gia and in the zones of concentration of the separatist forces 
(Gudauta- Gagra districts and Tkhvarcheli zone) and direct 
support of the above mentioned dictatorship by means of guar-
anteeing of the security aspect; 
6) Economic and Financial aid of the separatist regime 
mostly of the military character and not of the social-humani-
tarian one; (Order of President B. Eltsin on making of the trade 
– economic agreement of the Stavropol and Krasnodar Regions 
32. Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze.  For whom is benefi-
cial the  fratricidal war in Abkhazia, p. 1-2.
33. Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze. Participation of the 
Armed Forces of Russia  in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, 1993, 
p. 4.     
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with the Abkhazia; Credit lines of the “Agrobank”, bank “Re-
vival”, the exchange market of the National Bank of Russia, 
Moscow Central Stock Exchange etc). 
7) Providing of the Separatists with the Intelligence Ser-
vice, starting with the strategic information and ending with 
the air cosmic schemes of stationing of the Georgian army; It 
has to be marked, that as soon as the war started followed the 
structural reorganization of the Bureau of the town of Sochi of 
the Ministry of Security of Russia, creation of the foreign re-
connaissance territorial department and increase of its person-
nel by adding 40 staffing positions. In the central office of the 
Russian Foreign Intelligence Service “Georgian Department” 
was formed34. The whole complex of the military-expert aid to 
the Separatists. From this aspect is especially important provi-
sion of the army regiments with the strategic management and 
operative and tactic planning of the military operations by the 
Russian Generalship ( V. Kolsenikov, A.Chindarov, I.Sigutkin, 
G.Kondratiev, A.Kvashnin) and Officer Corps ( Colonel Sido-
renko, Colonel Akulinchev, Colonel Bondarenko, Major Kolo-
din, Major Semiulin, Captain Nikolaev and others); 
8) Psychological war of the Top Authorities of Russia 
against the authorizes of Georgia, permanently threatening 
them with the air attack on Tbilisi and others places, blockage 
of the significant military operations of the Georgian army ( in 
organizing of the psychological pressure especially active were 
Vice-President A. Rutskoi, Speaker of the Parliament R. Khaz-
bulatob and Minister for the Special Affairs – S. Shoigu); 
9) Propagandist and informational-analytical support of 
the Separatists in Russia, Post-Soviet Space and several masked 
informational space of that time world. Mediacratic help pro-
vided to the Gudauta grouping by Russia and false informational 
sphere formed by means of that support negatively influenced 
the geoinformational factors of the Abkhazian war. 
34. Personal archive of Colonel G. Maisuradze, Participation of the 
Armed Forces of Russia in the Georgian-Abkhazian Conflict, 1993,p. 5. 
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10) Diplomatic-Political support of the Separatists regime. 
For this purpose the double standard threefold diplomatic for-
mat was craftily used by the Kremlin. That format contained 
three channels of political regulation – Russian-Georgian, Rus-
sian – Abkhazian and Georgian – Abkhazian. I.e. the Russian 
diplomacy manipulated with non-homogeneity of the dialogue 
platform and negotiations with the parties, as well as and among 
them. The strategy of the Russian “ Military Diplomacy” was the 
mixture of intimidation and cunning hypocrisy; It forced Geor-
gia through political pressure and offering of the false mediato-
ry guarantees to make agreements of capitulatory character and 
used the inadequate tactics of encouragement of the separatists 
to break the agreement and refining of Russia’s personal mission. 
It was the diplomatic policy of Russia that created the diplomat-
ic-agreement basis for Georgia to lose the war. 
We think, that theses and other signs of Russian aggressing 
in the systematic wholeness and from the typological determi-
nation aspect create the matrix of the hybrid war. It goes with-
out saying, that hybrid wars are the special phenomenon, but 
their separate elements, with a certain amount and configura-
tion were met in the past and the same can applied to the policy 
being conducted by Russia in the Post Soviet space in the 90-ies 
of the previous century and videlicet to the war of the years of 
1992-1993; Russia chose Abkhazia for acting against Georgia; 
as for Abkhazia Russia chose there as the “support Group” the 
grouping of V; Ardzinba; Afterwards, through using the Con-
stitutional conflict of the Separatist grouping with the Central 
Power of Georgia, formed the controlled chaotic atmosphere, a 
certain “clever anarchy”; After creating the situation of grow-
ing the crisis into the military skirmish, thereof preparing of 
the military situation; Russia based its actions on the forms of 
the direct military intervention – the military, economic, dip-
lomatic and informational direct and indirect forms of the aid 
rendered to the Separatists.
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Videlicet, that synthesis, in one and the same war, in one 
and the same operational space with simultaneous usage of the 
regular regiments and hired forces, with the diplomatic and in-
formational-propagandist battle being carried out together with 
the military operations, combining the irregular-asymmetric 
forms with the regular tactic forms, mixing and mingling of the 
conventional and non - conventional methods – exactly that 
multilayer synthesis provide the grounding to claim, that the 
war of the years of 1992-1993 and participation of Russia in 
that war be assessed as the hybrid war conducted by the Krem-
lin against Georgia. 
On September 3 of 1992 in Moscow was signed the agree-
ment on the conflict solving about the territorial integrity of 
Georgia. In the Article 9 of the Agreement was marked: “the 
armed forces of the Russian Federation temporarily stationing 
on the territory of Republic of Georgia and in Abkhazia as well, 
safeguard neutrality and are not participating in the conflict.” 
According to the article 11 it is forbidden to infiltrate the hired 
groupings from the territories of the Republics of the North 
Caucasus.”35 The conventional conditions of the Agreement 
were violated by the Kremlin on September 3. 
On September 22 of 1992 the battle vehicle of the troopers 
stationed in Qvemo (Lower) Eshera shelled the positions of the 
Georgian units.36 The Russian subdivisions undertaking the ar-
rack after the cease of fire subduied to their control strategically 
significant object – Sokhumi petroleum base and flour mill. 
On Septemebr 25 of 1992 the Supreme Council of Russian 
Federation passed the resolution on the “ situation having palce 
in the North Caucasus in regard with the Akhazian events.37 
That eight point document was the direct approval for involve-
ment of Russia in the Abkhazian war. The resolution had a dis-
35. Abkhazian Labyrinth. Tbilisi, 1999, p. 217-218. 
36. Excerpts  from the History of Georgia. Abkhazia. Tbilisi, 2007, p. 
357. 
37. Diplomatic Messenger. 1992,N1-2. p. 24-25.
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tinct anti - Georgian and pro-Abkhazian nature being corre-
sponding to the aggressive, imperial course of the Kremlin and 
the annexation strategy of being involved in the war. 
In the first point of the Resolution the Supreme Council of 
Russia demanded to “withdraw the Georgian army formations 
from the territory of Abkhazia”, and in the fourth point tit de-
manded to “use the military formations of Russia as peaceful 
forces”, i.d. direct involvement into the war under the mask of 
the peacemaking mission. 
In other words, all that was aimed to the full support of the 
separatist regime of Abkhazia in the war against Georgia. Ac-
cording to the Resolution passed on September 25 the imperi-
al elite of the Kremlin, generalship and the whole “war party” 
passed the legislative mechanism of meddling into the conflict 
of Abkhazia and launching of the anti-Georgian hybrid war. 
The enemy used their opportunity when the Georgian par-
ty’s attention was distracted due to the September 3 Agreement 
and decided to attack the Gagra zone, occupy it and deblock the 
strategic clot of Gudauta-Axali Afoni. 
On September 1 of 1992 the Russian-Abkahzian-Confeder-
ate regiments started the mass attack in the direfction of Gagra. 
The fact, that before the attack the Russain peacemakers being 
stationed there according to the Agreement from Septemebr 3 
left the observational control points and retunred to the palce 
of their stationing. On the evening of October 1 the enemy oc-
cupied village Kolkhida, and on October 2 - Gagra. 
After leaving Gagra, from the formations moving to the 
North General G.Kharkharashvili tried to form an integral mil-
itary group, but due to the existing chaos and dezorganization 
he failed to do it. On October 6 the enemy occupied Leselidze 
and Gantiadi and crossed the Georgian –Russian border.  
In the military operation of Gagra together with the Ab-
kahzian and Confederate formations ( “AAbkhazian Battalion” 
of Sh. Basaev) the regular divisions of the Russian army took an 
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active part; Videlicet, the zenith – rocket regiment N 643 and 
squadron of the parachute landing regiment N 345 consisting 
of 100 men. They helped the attacking Abkhazian-Confederate 
formations with the manpower and fighting equipment. 
The group of the Russian Black Sea fleet ships ( “Bezuko-
riznenni”, “Kil – 25”,”Don”, “Golovin”, “BTH – 38”,” “BM” – 66”) 
helped the Separatists from the Sea Aquatorium and shelled the 
so-called enemy.38 The operational tasks of the group were block-
ing the landing of the troops coming to help the Georgian mili-
tary groupings fighting in the Gagra zone (“White Eagle”, Mkh-
derioni” and divisions of the Police), as well as the navy overlap 
of the concentration points of the Separatists. 
Commander of the ship group, Captain of the first rank V. 
Fomin marked in his report: “On October 1 according to the 
plan the educational demonstration trainings for the officers of 
the headquarters were conducted with the aim of checking of 
the fighting abilities of Gudauta aviation and armored vehicles. 
The next day, on October 2 at 17:00 the first Deputy Minister 
of defense General-Colonel G.G. Kondratiev gave the following 
tasks to the military ships: 
1. In any circumstances not to allow to land the navy 
troops of Georgia to the Bichvinta district. If necessary they 
were allowed to use the weapon. 
2. To defend the Gudauta airport.39 
The other sources confirm that General – Colonel Kondrati-
ev at night of October 2 from 11 p.m. to 12 a.m. was on board of 
“the Bezukoriznenni” and personally place in operational read-
iness of the ship.40
Representational analyzes of the sources and summarizing 
of the informational block give us the possibility of asserting, 
that the general commandment of the military operation of 
Gagra was managed by the Headquarters of the Russian armed 
38. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 208. 
39. Nadareishvili T. Plot Against Georgia. Tbilisi, 2000, p. 51-52. 
40. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 218.  
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forces and the direct commandment was conducted by the first 
Deputy – Minister of Defense – General-Colonel G. Kondratiev. 
 Loss of Gagra played an extremely negative part in the dy-
namics of the war from the strategic and operational aspect. 
The enclave position of the enemy grouping was broken and 
the Separatists got a chance of establishing the direct commu-
nication with their supporter Russia. Due to that fact, the Rus-
sian- Abkhazian-Confederate Coalition was formed from the 
geographical-Topographical point of view and from the inte-
gral-non –discretional aspect of the theatre of military opera-
tions. 
On November 3 of 1992 the Georgian regiments successful-
ly countered an attack of the Russian-Abkhazian military forces 
in the labor sector of the Gumista front. In order to compensate 
the failure Russia activated tactics of the “Distant War.” The 
intense bombing of the operative space controlled by Sokhumi 
and the Central Georgian power was launched from the air and 
with the help of the volley fire reactive artillery. All this was 
delivered by the Russian aviation and the intervention zones 
created by the Russian army (Bombora, Qvemo (Lower) Eshera, 
“Maiak”, Ochamchire base). 
On November 5 two battle-planes of the Su-25 type orga-
nized an air-assault Reid to the Georgian regiment stationed on 
the river Gumista. The same happened on November 15 and 
18; On November 18 Russian airs –forces bombed the vicinity 
of Sokhumi (Kelasuri). 
From the beginning of December the Headquarters of Gen-
eral G. Kharkharashvili planned the assault operation to the 
Eastern front, in Abkhazian and Armenian Atara and after-
wards from the South – Western flank on the town of Tkh-
varcheli. 
On December 3 the united grouping of the “personal reg-
iment” of the Minister of Defense and the 5th battalion of the 
brigade N23 occupied the above mentioned villages, but on De-
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cember 10 Russian air-forces bombed the bridge on the river 
Kodori and the vicinity of that latter, resulting in the numerous 
victims and termination of the attack.41
On December 2-9 squadrons of the Russian air-regiment 
N529 repeatedly bombed the residential districts of the town of 
Sokhumi. Bombing of the Sokhumi market was followed by the 
death of the 13 peaceful citizens. On December 11 during the 
air attack 11 peaceful citizens of the village Alkhaldaba of the 
Ochamchire District were killed, more than 60 were wounded. 
During the air attacks on the Georgian regiment positions 
and compact dwelling zones of the Georgian population of 
Sokhumi and Ochamchire Districts Russia inconsiderately vi-
olated a number of international acts and among them the ar-
ticles of the Genève Convention from August 12 of 1949 on 
the prohibition of usage of the point headed shells and clus-
ter-weapon dispensers in the course of war. 
At the end of November of 1992 the Georgian and Russian 
military institutions signed the Agreement on the stationing 
of the Russian subdivisions in the conflict zone of Abkhazia?42 
The Agreement maintained changing of the positions of the 
stationing of the Russian armed units in the operational zones; 
they have to leave Sokhumi and its vicinity and the Esher mil-
itary laboratory. But the Kremlin violated the Agreement and 
increased the staff of the troopers with the separate squadrons. 
It is worth mentioning, that as a motive for the violation of 
the Agreement was named the false institutional disobedience 
played out by the Commandment of the Trans Caucasian mil-
itary District and the headquarters of the Russian army group 
stationed in Abkhazia. 
In December of 1992, by the order of deputy Command-
er –in –Chief of the paratroopers of Russia, General-Major Si-
gutkin, 450 soldier special battalion, together with the military 
41. Jojua D. Fall of Sokhumi. Tbilisi, 2014, p. 87. 
42. Problem of Abkhazia in the Official Documents, 1, Tbilisi, 1999, 
p. 108. 
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technique, such as 30 units of fighting vehicles for the foot-sol-
diers, 6 units of MI_type helicopters, 8 units of self-propelled 
antiaircraft system landed on the airdrome of Babushera. On 
December 22 – 25 from Sochi and Adler to Gudauta was sent 
12 wagon loaded with the armored vehicles ( Personal archive 
of Colonel G. Maisuradze, Participation of the Armed Forces of 
Russia in the Georgian-Russian Conflict, 1993, f. 2). 
Since that time the Commandment of the Russian Army and 
the Officer Corps have been factually turned into the group of 
the advisers and a special military mission of the Separatist re-
gime; The Kremlin used the Separatist regime to turn Abkhazia 
into the military-political protectorate. 
For the first stage of the war of 1992 – 1993 and inspired 
of the fall of Gagra, the armed forces of Georgia and Georgian 
civil authorities of Abkhazia controlled the major part of the 
Autonomous Republic including the town of Sokhumi. The 
operative structure of the theatre for the military actions was 
acceptable for Georgia: the Gudauta-Akhali –Afoni groupings 
of the enemy were demarcated by the operative zone of the 
Sokumi-Gulripsh Georgian groupings; Tkhvarcheli grouping 
was in blockade, but the non-blockade condition of the Gudau-
ta-Akhali Afoni grouping was stipulated with the participation 
of Russia in the warfare and the direct communication of the 
Separatists with the help of the Gagra-Leselidze sector with the 
territory of the Russian Federation; 
The blockade chain was interlocked by the Gumista front 
line; The Sokhumi-Gulripsh grouping of the Georgian forces 
delimited from each other two centers of the two historical sub 
region of Abkhazia and military concentration of Separatists – 
Bzip – Gudauta and Abjua- Tkhvarcheli. 
On January and March of 1993 The Russian-Abkha-
zian-Confederate Coalition tried to liquidate the Blockade 
chain and burst open the line of front at Gumista and occupy 
Sokhumi. 
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On January 2 of 1993 Russian-Abkhazian forces stationed 
at Gumista fired Sokhumi residential blocks from the “Grad” 
type missile launchers, for spreading panic and fear among the 
soldiers and peaceful population. On January 4-5, the enemy 
assaulted at night the Achandara district of the Gumista front. 
The attacking groups managed to force the river Gumista and 
form a foothold on the left bank of the river. But, after the 
counterattack of the Georgian artillery and divisions of the bri-
gade N5 the enemy was destroyed. The enemy lost almost 90 
soldiers and 5 armored vehicles.43
On February of 1993 Parliament of Georgia passed a special 
Resolution on the “military units of Russia stationed on the ter-
ritory of Abkhazia.” 44 Existence of the Russian military forces 
on the territory of Abkhazia was considered inadmissible and 
E. Shevardnadze was commissioned to start negotiations with 
President Eltsin on withdrawal of the Russian army. 
On February 18 of 1993 the delegation of Russia came with 
the official visit to Tbilisi. Within the frames of the visit the 
Chairman of the lower chamber of Parliament of Russia (coun-
cil of nations) R. Abdulatipov and Vice-Premier of the Russian 
Government S. Shakhrai met with the representative delega-
tion of the authorities of Georgia (V. Rcheulishvili, S.Kavsadze 
and R. Gotsiridze). In the communiqué45 passed after the nego-
tiations were documented several non constructive moments 
concerning the Abkhazia conflict, but under the guise of the 
general phraseology of normalization and development of 
peaceful cooperation between Russian and Georgian States. 
More than one diplomatic mine found the way into the 
communiqué due to the elementary disregard and ignoring of 
the protocol requirements by the Georgian delegation. Videli-
cet: was recorded readiness of arranging another summit meet-
ing under the aegis of the Coordinating Council of the North 
43. Jojua D. Fall of Sokhumi…,p. 87. 
44. Regional Conflicts…, p. 85. 
45. Newspaper «republic of Georgia”, February 25 of 1993. 
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Caucasus on September 3 of 1993 within the ill-fated Moscow 
Agreement, which in fact meant restoring of that format fol-
lowed by the Gagra tragedy; “Renewal of the Negotiations ac-
cording to the Agreement of September 3 was emphasized.” 
Was voiced the opinion on spreading of the mandate of the 
Peaceful Forces on the defense of the border between Russia and 
Georgia being in force on the basis of the Dagomis Agreement. 
By the Resolution made on March 4 of 1993 the Parliament 
of Georgia refuted the communiqué from February.46 But the 
diplomatic confrontation did not end there and the Kremlin 
launched a repeated conventional attack against the integrity 
and territorial sovereignty of Georgia: On March 6 of 1993 the 
Supreme Council of the Presidium of Russia included in the list 
of issues being discussed within the agenda of the session and it 
was the so-called act on the “recognition of the Republic of the 
South Ossetia”.47 
 The large scale onset of the Russian-Abkhazian-Confederate 
Coalition to the Gumista front was launched on March 14-17 
of 1993. The attack was started by the air-forces of Russia and 
heavy artillery of the Separatists and Sokhumi and front posi-
tions of the Georgian army were bombed. It was followed by the 
land advance of the Abkhazians, Confederates and Russian ‘Slav-
bat” and mass attack of the regular air and sea forces of Russia. 
A Special Operations Militia squadron of Riga ( the so-called 
“Omon of Riga” ( special purpose police unit) under command 
of Major M. Linnik, actively participated in the battles. After 
the Vilnius events of January 1991 it was moved to Russia and 
periodically used in the so-called “hot spots”. The aim of the 
squadron was to land via the mountain to the Achadara bridge, 
occupy it and continue the onset from the left wing in the di-
rection of the town of Sokhumi48.
46. Information made by Parliament of Georgia, 1993 N5-8 , p.  22-23. 
47. Regional Conflicts…p. 86. 
48.  M. Skrinnikov “VDV from the Skies to the battle”. www. Soku-
mi. Info ?2016/12/vdv – s-neba –v- boi.html?m=1   
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 After the bloodshed battles the enemy managed to break 
the tactic line of the Georgian units on the central segment of 
the Gumista front and penetrated into the territory occupied 
by the brigade N23. Two squadrons of the military air - forces 
of Russia systematically provide with the air support the land 
onset of the military forces of Russian-Abkhazian-Confederate 
Coalition. We’ll cite a passage from the book of the commander 
of the Russian squadron Major Al. Koshkin:” The Abkhazians 
were preparing the regular break of the front line (Assault of 
the March 15-16 of 1993 – D.J.). We operated mostly at night 
and in the bad weather conditions… we took the aim of every-
thing ordered by the headquarters…and in Sokhumi as well, 
where according to our Intelligence service was located the 
headquarters of the Georgian army… together with the other 
type bombs and shells we used the reconnaissance flare, as we 
know from the Afghanistan experience, that if you work on 
the aim at night the lighting is necessary…”49 At the very same 
time the Air-Forces of Russia bombed from the town of Poti  
the column of the armored vehicles moving from 30 km. 
from Sokhumi, killing almost 200 Georgian soldiers and de-
stroying tens of battle vehicles of troopers. The headquarters 
of the second army corps and Kelasuri weapon storage was also 
bombed.50 But, exactly there it was encircled by the Georgian 
army and found itself in a “saucepan” being created by the pro-
fessional, operative mass shooting. Losses of the enemy were 
great, as more than 2000 soldiers died, and a lot of military 
technique was destroyed. The counter attack of the Georgian 
army to the Gumista front ended on March 17 in returning of 
the status quo it had before March 14. 
Thus, in the battles of January and March of 1993 the Geor-
gian armed forces by means of wise and strong defense, dis-
organization of the attacking groupings of the enemy, coun-
terattacking the centre and flanks of the Gumista front by the 
49. Koshkin A. The above mentioned work. 
50. Ibid. 
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artillery thus frustrating the efforts of the enemy to occupy 
Sokhumi and achieve the strategic advantage. 
On the other hand, the inconvertibility of the aggressive 
policy of Russia was obvious, as well as its desire of being in-
volved in the war and expanding the operational zones. 
In its Appeal to the “UNDP, European Parliament, Parlia-
ments of the world States the Supreme Council of Russia” made 
on March 17 of the year of 1993 the parliament of Georgia as-
sessed the deeds of Russia, as “the aggressive policy conducted 
towards the Sovereign State, the aim of which is splitting Ab-
khazia from Georgia and violation of the territorial supremacy 
of Georgia.”51
On March 17 of 1993 the Supreme legislative organ of Mos-
cow – The Council of Deputies accepted the appeal to the Su-
preme Council of Russia on imposing sanctions against Georgia.52
On March 19 of 1993 in the north sector of the Gumista 
front the Georgian zenith artillery shot down the battle-plane 
of the air-forces of Russia – “SU – 27” ( board N11), navigated 
by Major V. Shipko53 commissioned from the Rostov District 
air-base to Gudauta. 
All this left no doubt, that Russia participated in the war 
and the Russia official informational sources started statement 
of that fact. One of the main newspapers “Izvestia” published 
the list of the armament and weapon given to the Separatists: 
7 tanks, 20 armored vehicles, 12 artillery units, among them 
“Uragan” and “Grad” type missile launchers.54
The essential part of intervention of Russia was providing 
with the special service and military investigation assistance of 
the Separatist regime. It means development of the agent ap-
paratus, formation of the “Fifth Column” groupings from the 
Russian and Armenian population located in the rear area of 
51. The Problem of Abkhazia…1, p. 144. 
52. Abkhazian Labyrinth …, p. 209. 
53. Nadareishvili T. Plot…p. 52. 
54. Newspaper “Izvestia”, March 17 of 1993. 
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the Georgian military forces, as well as creation of the mobile 
net for sabotage and espionage. 
On March 31 of 1993 in the town of Sokhumi during con-
ducting the intelligence investigation was captured Lieutenant 
of the Russian army Al. Sitnikov, who was specially commis-
sioned to Abkhazia from the military regiment stationed in the 
Moscow District. 
On April 1 of 1993 the Commander of the radio station 
of the Russian military regiment (N2011) Senior Sergeant Al. 
Lunev was captured. It appeared that Lunev on March 17-22 
through the Russian military regiment radio station informed 
the Abkhazian formations about the dispositions of the Geor-
gian regiments on the front line and about their armament, as 
well as about the operational conditions in Sokhumi.55
On March 23 of 1993 the confidential meeting of V. Ardzin-
ba with President B. Eltsin took place. At the very same day the 
so-called “Supreme Council of the Republic of Abkhazia” (in 
reality the Abkhazian fraction of the former legislative organ 
of the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia) sent an appeal to the 
Supreme Council of Russia expressing its desire of “entering of 
Abkhazia into the composition of the Russian Federation or be-
ing accepted under the protection of Russia”. It is remarkable, 
that the Parliament of Russia did not cancel that secession doc-
ument, but on April 30 of the year of 1993 gave President Eltsin 
the Resolution to start the negotiations with the official Tbilisi 
about the topic of the Appeal.56 
On April 1 of 1993 in the Resolution being passed by the 
Parliament of Georgia was said:” On the part of the territory of 
Georgia located in Abkhazia, which is controlled by the Gudau-
ta grouping with the support of the Russian army the policy of 
ethnic cleansing is being conducted, which took the form of the 
55. Nadareishvili T. Plot…p. 54. 
56. Gazette of the Congress of the People’s Deputies of Russian Fed-
eration and Supreme Council of Russian Federation, N20, 1993, p. 
1215. 
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genocide of the Georgian and other nationality citizens.”57
On that very day the Parliament of Georgia passed the “Ap-
peal to the United Nations Organization, the Advisors of Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe, International Organizations 
of Human Rights”. That appeal not only confirms the previ-
ous information, but gives much stricter appraisal to the events 
having place in Abkhazia and participation in those events of 
the Russian Federation. The Appeal reads:” On the part of the 
territory of Georgia located in Abkhazia, which is controlled 
by the Gudauta grouping with the support of the Russian army 
the policy of ethnic cleansing is being conducted, which took 
the form of the genocide of the Georgian and other nationality 
citizens. Systematic mass killing, shooting and unbelievable op-
pression forces the Georgian population to leave their dwelling 
places. 
On April 27 of 1993 the Parliament of Georgia passed the 
regular resolution on the withdrawal of the Russian military 
regiments from the conflict zone of Abkhazia. The dispositional 
Resolution was based on the following three moments: 1) vio-
lation by Russia of the Moscow Agreement made on September 
3 of 1992; 2) Genocide and the ethnic cleansing of the Georgian 
population on the territory controlled by the Russian army and 
Abkhazian Separatists; 3) Active participation of the contingent 
of the Russian army in the warfare against Georgia.58 
The Parliament of Georgia considers this kind of policy, as 
continuation of the aggression directed towards our State, the 
aim of which is violation of territorial integrity of Georgia and 
infringement on our independence. 
 The entire responsibility for the above mentioned policy lies 
on the shoulders if Russia, which for its imperialist reasons sup-
ports the Separatist grouping of Gudauta (the problem of Abkha-
57. The problem of Abkhazia in the Official Documents, part 1, p. 
151. 
58. Regional Conflict…, p. 87. 
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zia in the official documents part I, page 152). The Parliament 
of Georgia appealed to the International Organizations to carry 
out the active measures for suppression of aggression directed to-
wards Georgia on the territories controlled by the armed forces 
of Russia and Separatists for defending the Georgian population. 
On May 14 of 1993 in Moscow was signed the trilateral 
Agreement on cease fire and solving of the conflict in Abkhazia 
via peaceful methods. 
The Agreement, which according to the aims of the Krem-
lin, weakened the attention and the military vigilance of the 
Georgian side by the preliminarily planned diplomatic course, 
which was followed by the tragic strategic results. One of them 
was lifting of the blockade of Tkhvarcheli and deblocking of the 
strategic clot of the Tkhvarcheli grouping. The entirely unjusti-
fied consent being maintained by the Agreement made on May 
14, had place within the so-called Humanitarian corridor on the 
basis of the full trust towards the Russian mediatory mission. 
On May 17 of 1993 by the agreement of the Authorities of Geor-
gia, the Ministry of Special affairs of Russia conducted an opera-
tion of “Humanitarian” aid: the assault and transport ships carried 
from Sochi to Sokhumi 30 transport trailer of “Kamaz” type. That 
column from Sokhumi arrived in Tkhvarcheli unhampered and 
without any delay and monitoring. For the Blocked Tkhvarcheli 
together with the necessary provision and medicine a great num-
ber of bullets, battle material and manpower were transported to 
the needs of the so-called Eastern front of Abkhazia. 
On June 16, besides the “Humanitarian” act in May-June of 
1993 the Separatists with the help of the air-forces of Russia in-
creased their military forces on the “Eastern Front”. The central 
base of training and equipping fully of the volunteer- gunmen 
was in a special mission military camp located in Sabiken (50 
km.-s from Maikop). Moving of the manpower from the North 
Caucasus via air carriers and helicopters became systematical. 
Moving was carried out by means of the two parallel air 
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lines – from Teberda using the Dali- Tkhvarcheli line and from 
Gudauta via the South slopes of the Main Backbone of the Cau-
casus to Tkhvarcheli. 
Jerry Laber the executive director of “Helsinki Watch” (of 
one of the subdivisions of the “Human Rights Watch”) is unam-
biguously and clearly points to the fact of the recruiting and pe-
riodic moving to the conflict zone of the half-military formations 
hired by Russia in a special letter sent to President Eltsin on No-
vember 1 of 1993. The document reads, that “Helsinki Watch” 
recorded the facts on recruiting in Russia of the hired manpower 
for Abkhazia for serving in the half military formations and their 
attacks and assaults to the civil objects… half military formations 
used the Russian weapon and heavy technique against the civil 
population.59 Helsinki Watch declares, that acts of Russia cannot 
be considered the mission of the good will any more. 
According to the data of the Georgian Intelligence Service 
Structures “On the Eastern Front” the grouping of the enemy 
comprised 3000-3300 soldiers; among them were 600 soldiers 
moved to the concentration points of the military regiments 
of the Separatists (Atara, Kutouli, Jgerdash, Labrash, Chlou, 
Mokvi, Merkula and others). 60 
 In the net of the military groups prevailing were the groups 
and subgroups consisting of the Russian nationality regular of-
ficers serving within the frames of the Separatist groupings. 
For Example, “Dolphin”, “Edelveis”, “Scorpio”, “Drag-
on”,”Katrin”, detachment of the Cossacks and others. They 
played a crucial part in the army structure of the Tkhvarcheli 
grouping and accomplished important diversionary operations 
and operative-tactic mission. 
The typical example of the direct participation of Russia in 
the warfare having place on the “Eastern Front” are the oper-
ations conducted by the special group “dolphin”. We will give 
59. “Helsinki Watch” to the Russian Authorities www. valberta.ca/
hhihejro/NG 96 95 11 45 166.html
60.  Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 124. 
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to these problems a thorough analysis using the operative ma-
terials being searched and published by the journal “Arsenal”.61 
The materials consist of the orders from the book and jour-
nal for the military actions (orders, decisions and reports), mak-
ing it informationally resistant, doubtless and valid source. 
The special group “Dolphin” was formed by the order of 
General-Colonel N. Matveev on the base of the special battal-
ion “Dnestr” - belonging to the Ministry of Internal Affairs of 
the Ministry of the so-called Dnestr Region of the Republic of 
Moldova” controlled by Russia. The special group consisted of 
Major I.Pimenov (Commander and Inspector-Instructor), Ma-
jor A. Terentiev, Major A. Butko, Captain N. Danilin, Lieuten-
ants E. Rijikov, A. Tsurkin, I.Kulakov and R. Kalungarian. 
As it is marked in the order N12 by Major Pimenov, the 
group was formed and arrived in Gudauta on May 10 of 1993, 
then it was moved to Tkhvarcheli ( May 15) for “ successful ful-
filling of the military tasks and providing Republic of Abkhazia 
with the International support.” 
The military functions of the special group “Dolphin” are 
more precisely revealed in one official document – V. Ardzin-
ba’s thank you letter to the above mentioned General N. Mat-
veev, in which the leader of the separatists names the “merits” 
of the special group: “ carrying out of the diversionary work in 
the in the rear of the Fascist Georgian army; Capturing of the 
especially dangerous recidivist on the territory of Tkhvarheli 
garrison; Receiving of the staff members of the State Commit-
tee of the special situations on the high professional level; Dis-
information of the enemy and its disorientation, enabling us to 
make a successful advance on the total line of the front.”62 
A full picture of the actions of the special group, from the 
elementary operative and tactic proportion aspect gives and ob-
vious strategic indicator of participation in the war; Only one 
61. Journal «Arsenal”, March 2015, N3 p. 50-53. 
62. Nadareishvili T. Plot against Georgia…, p. 42. 
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8 man group in the operational space of the “Eastern Front” in 
the rear of the Georgian units carried out 12 combat and diver-
sionary operations, destroyed 34 soldiers, exploded the bridge 
and radio-relay station, captured several units of the military 
technique and damaged a plane, at the same time through the 
preliminary planned disorientating action created the operative 
situation to confuse the Georgian party and start of the mass 
attack of the total front of the enemy. 
In the bases of the analyses of the operative material we can 
give specific facts on several operations organized by the group 
“Dolphin: On May 16 of 1993 everybody through that the Geor-
gian landing troops made a lodgment. By request of the Abkhazian 
party the “Dolphin” combed Tkhvarcheli area and its vicinity. 
On May 20-24 of 1993 the armored vehicles of the Georgian 
army gathered on the height of 70, 9 and shelled the Abkhazian 
formation stationed in the village Beslakhuba. In response the 
“Dolphin” carried out a special operation – and after the pre-
liminary investigation destroyed the manpower of the attack-
ing group and technique. 
On May 25-28 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin” and 
“Bat” investigated the automobile and railway bridges in the 
village Adziubja for the purpose of later exploding them. 
On June 7 of 1993 the members of the “Dolphin” carried out a 
special operation in the village Poqvesh against the firing-points 
of the Georgians. As a result, two Georgian soldiers were killed; 
one machine-gun and two automatic rifles were removed. 
On June 10 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin “and 
“Bat” destroyed the Georgian radio-rally station. 
On June 20 of 1993 the group “Dolphin” set an ambush and 
shelled a Georgian tank in the vicinity of the village Pirveli 
Okhurei, but the tank managed to hide; it was the reason of 
changing the route of the guided missile; as a result of the ex-
plosion 2 Georgian soldiers died and 4 were wounded. 
On June 22 of 1993 the group shelled a vacuum bomb to 
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the military-field diner located in the village Bedia. 4 Georgian 
soldiers were killed. 
On June 25 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin: and 
“Bat” from the area of the village Adziubja shelled the heat-
flare to the Georgian military – passenger plane landing in the 
Babushera airport. The heat-flare hit the right engine and the 
plane caught fire. The pilots managed to land, but it was dam-
aged and beyond of repair. 
On June 25 of 1993 the joint groups of the “Dolphin” and 
“Bat” headed the Dali Gorge and destroyed one pillar of the 
high frequency electrical line. 
On July 1 of 1993 the group ‘Dolphin” participated in the 
large-scale operation of liberating one of the villages. 
Beginning with that period the Russian strategy of conduct-
ing the hybrid war against Georgia underwent a certain evolu-
tion, not to say the real transformation and moves to the final 
stage. For the Kremlin the function of the current war was an 
ultimate failure of Georgia, split of its territorial integrity and 
occupation of Abkhazia. 
The fact, that for Russia the war in Abkhazia had long became 
the instrument for carrying out of the imperial and hegemonis-
tic geopolitical project policy, became obvious, the leaders of the 
Kremlin changed the format of strategic planning a bit: For Sum-
mer of 1993 the operative-strategic conditions showed a clear 
need for the Russian-Abkhazian alliance of changing the strategy 
of the military operations. Videlicet, it was obvious, that without 
the large-scale intervention of Russia and using the one –way 
tactics it was impossible to occupy Sokhumi, not to say anything 
about the fact, that at that time the military technique arsenal of 
the Georgian party was in hands of the Sokhumi-Gulripsh group-
ing. The enemy was facing the dilemma: either the large-scale 
aggression of Russia, or changing of the tactic landmarks in the 
conditions of the hybrid war. The Kremlin chose another way. 
A new strategy maintained the combined tactic format; it was 
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simultaneous attack on all the sections of the both fronts, using 
the preliminary elaborated disorienting military maneuvers, the 
aim of which was shifting of the attention of the Georgian party 
on that main blow. In other words, the main purposes of starting 
the advance on the Eastern front were not achieving success on 
that front, but outmaneuver the enemy on the Gumista front due 
to disorienting the Georgian party. 
Within the frames of that strategy, the General Staff of the 
Ministry of Defense of Russia elaborated a special, secret plan 
for occupying Sokhumi consisting of the four parts: “1. Taking 
of the Ochamchire highway by the Tkhvarcheli grouping; 2. 
Landing of the assault forces at Tamish and unification of that 
latter with the Tkhvarcheli grouping; 3. Simultaneous attack 
from Gumista for taking the strategic heights; 4. Finally, encir-
cling of Sokhumi and taking it.”63 
We have to emphasize the fact, that: the plan was entirely 
elaborated in the operative department of the General Staff of 
Russia, as for its practical realization during the military opera-
tions it was fulfilled with the help of the General Staff of Russia 
and military-expert special groups of officers. The local Abkha-
zian commanders (the so-called Commander - in –Chief V. Ar-
dzinba, the so-called Minister of Defense S.Sosnaliev, and the 
so-called Head of the General Staff S. Dbar) were responsible 
only for the selection and planning of the local tactical variants. 
On July 1 of 1993 the General Staff of the Russian Army 
prepared and provided the army stationed in Abkhazia with the 
aerospace maps of the military operation zones.64
On July 2 near the Village Tamish the Russian-Abkhazian 
landing troops containing 300 soldiers disembarked from the 
Ships of the Russian Navy Forces, they were armed with one tank, 
armored vehicle and “Grad” type missile apparatus. The regular 
military units of Russia and among them the operational group 
under the command of V. Sorokin made the nuclear of the landing 
63. Essays…, p. 360. 
64. Abkhazia Labyrinth, p. 209. 
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troops. It is well-known, that in the planning of the landing troops 
participated Colonel of Russian Military Intelligence65. 
 Georgian formations stationed at Tamish and Labra ( sep-
arate groups of Brigade N24, subdivisions of Q. Cholokhashvi-
li regiment,”Avaza” ( Panther) and “Tetri Artsivi”(White Ea-
gle), due to the unexpected situation did no manage to block 
the landing operation. After forming a foothold at Tamish the 
landing troops managed to join the Tkhvarcheli grouping and 
with the united forces started to block and control the Ocham-
chire-Sokhumi Highway sections. 
The function of Tamish operation was distracting of atten-
tion. On the same July 2 formations of the enemy started mass 
attack to the central and right sectors of the Gumista front. They 
managed to force the river, break through the front line and 
occupy the villages to the North of Sokhumi – Kaman, Akha-
lsheni and Guma. On July 9 the Russian –Abkhazian forces oc-
cupied the village Shroma and gained control over the Akhbiuk 
strategic heights.66 
In the operation of occupation of Shroma - “Omon” ( Special 
purpose police unit) - (Major Melnikov and air-landing battal-
ion ( Lieutenant –colonel Nikulnikov) actively participated in 
the battle. Namely, that latter occupied positions on the moun-
tain heights67. 
The Georgian units due to the faultless especially of the 
heavy artillery of the Brigades N11 and N24 and heroic bat-
tle and coordinated operative-tactic arrangements managed to 
destroy the operation of the landing troops of Tamish; only a 
small part of the landing troops succeeded in breaking through 
the encirclement and join with the Tkhvarcheli grouping. 
The events of the beginning of July changed the strategic sit-
65. (“GRU” - RMI) - Krasovski  (Personal Archive of  Colonel G. Mai-
suradze, reference, p. 5.).   
66. Jojua D. Fall of Sokhumi, p. 91. 
67. M. Skrinnikov “VDV from the Skies to the battle”. www. Sokumi. 
Info ?2016/12/vdv – s-neba –v- boi.html?m=1       
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uation negatively for Georgia. On the Gumista front the enemy 
gained the strategic advantage, factually breaking the front in the 
middle, separatists gained control over the Akhbiuk heights and 
over the strategically significant Shroma - Sokhumi highway. On 
the Eastern front through occupying certain villages of Ocham-
chire District, the formations of the enemy formed an operative 
zone near the central highway. From that zone it was far much 
easy to lock a long tract of strategic communication of Ocham-
chire –Sokhumi - from the village Labra to the river Kodori Bridge. 
On July 21 the air-forces of Russia and Navy bombed 
Sokhumi and the railway station of the village Dranda. On July 
23 the Russian –Abkhazian units of the Tkhvarcheli grouping 
attacked Tamish and Labra. On July 24 the air-forces of Russia 
and artillery bombed the dwelling buildings of Sokhumi cit-
izens (especially a new district and Queen Tamar street (the 
former Chanba Street). 
On July 27 of 1993 and Agreement on “Cease fire in Ab-
khazia and mechanisms of control on that latter”68 was signed 
in Sochi. The Agreement maintained the traditional first base 
complex of conflict resolution – cease fire, diverging of the war-
ring sides, demilitarization of Sokhumi and other zones, resto-
ration of functioning of the prewar state structures, formation 
of controlling mechanisms of managing the peaceful process 
and monitoring - the first was “regulation of the unified trilat-
eral commission” and a group of observers, military mission of 
UNDP observers. 
One moment if worth attention within the context of our 
research. For guaranteeing the regime of non usage of force 
against each other the parties included one special point (point 
V) of the following contents: The parties consider necessary 
inviting and exploiting of the peaceful forces in the conflict 
zone… It is maintained that in case of agreement of the parties 
the size and composition of the peaceful forces was to be deter-
68.   Regional Conflicts   …, p. 111-112. 
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mined after the consultation with the Secretary General of UN 
and Council of Security.”69 
The international practice of conducting the peaceful oper-
ations, the international mission for restoring or supporting of 
peace and among them the so-called “classical formula” of UN 
forbids involving into such kind of operations of the participant 
party of the conflict. This was the reason of sending an appeal to 
the Secretary General of UN B. Ghali by the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs of Russian and Georgia for approving the participation 
of the Russian military contingent in the guarantee part of the 
Sochi Agreement; In the appeal the request to give permission to 
the Russian regiments N 901 and N 345 “as an exception” to ful-
fill the functions of the peaceful forces contingent was recorded. 
It goes without saying, that it was the forcible documented self- 
confession of Russia on participation in the war. 
As a form of the peaceful act, the Agreement of Sochi was 
in fact an ordinary facilitatory format agreement. But from the 
real political aspect and that time Georgian State capitulatory 
course and Russia’s cunning “military diplomacy” it was the 
action directed towards the war outcome; Even the more: the 
Agreement made on July 27 was the part of the operative plan 
of occupying Sokhumi through interrelation of the two ambiv-
alent factors - unconditional fulfillment by the Georgian par-
ty and “conditional” nonfulfillment by the Russian-Separatist 
party, thus the Agreement on loss of war by the Georgians and 
Occupation of Abkhazia by Russia. 
What gives us the base for saying this? What is the truth 
under this statement? 
On July 2-9 of 1993 the attack of the Russian –Abkhazian- 
Confederates, unfortunately, realized the 3 points out of 4-point 
plan of taking Sokhumi elaborated at the General Staff of Rus-
sia. Only the 4th point - occupation of Sokhumi remained to be 
fulfilled. The Sokhumi-Gulripsh grouping of the military forces 
69. Regional Conflicts…, p. 111. 
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of Georgia and this strategic- technique arsenal was on the way 
to fulfilling of the 4th point of that plan. Consequently, split of 
that grouping was badly needed, as well as withdrawal of its 
most part and its military technique from Abkhazia, blocking 
of the Sokhumi defense operative lines. The Agreement of July 
27 was made for that purpose. 
In the middle of August of 1993 via the intelligence channels, 
the department for counterespionage of the Informational –Intel-
ligence Service of Georgia obtained the secret document from the 
Kremlin – the plan under the code name of “Caucasian war.” 70 
The plan considered an entire complex of the regional military- 
strategic actions of Russia in the Caucasus: According to the Sochi 
Agreement advance on the factually disarmed Sokhumi, forcing of 
stalemated E. Shevardnadze to agree to bring the great amount of 
the Russian military contingent into Abkhazia. In the beginning 
that contingent was to control the strategic communications of the 
western part of Georgia, then it had to move to Azerbaijan and 
lastly to the South Caucasus having, where having the reliable rear 
it had to start the military operations in Chechnya. 
Thus, the main strategic aim of Russia was reoccupation-re-
annexation of the Caucasus and restoration of the close exclu-
sive impact regional geospace in the Caucasus. In the Abkhazia 
war loss of Georgia and occupation of Sokhumi was considered 
the chief instrument on the way of realization of that aim. In 
planning of reoccupation of the Caucasus, at that given stage 
and format of stationing of the strategic forces, the main enpha-
sis was made on the general advance on Sokhumi. The fact, is 
that from the position of the theatre of war or the configuration 
of forces from the sphere created by the indirect intervention 
into Abkhazian matters and false guarantees of diplomacy of 
Russia occupation of Sokhumi was considered the instrument 
for fulfilling the large-scale regional geostrategic project. 
In August of 1993, approximately on September 10 the au-
70. Batiashvili I. Plot against Georgia. Tbilisi, 2010, p. 6-7. 
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thorities of Georgia completed fulfilling of the military points of 
the Sochi Agreement: The Georgian sectors of the Gumista and 
Ochamchire fronts were closed, the basic military structures of 
the defense of Abkhazia - brigades N 23 and M24 of the army 
corps N 2 were dismissed and disarmed, other Georgian units and 
subdivisions were moved from Abkhazia to Poti, Samtredia and 
Kutaisi, Armored vehicles and heavy armament ( tanks, armored 
vehicles, battle cars of the troopers, artillery system, zenith 
equipment) were fully moved to Georgia ( Mainly with the help 
of hiring of the Russian military-transportation) (SIC!); Only 
2 Georgian observing points were left in the several kilometer 
stretch of the Gumista front, as for the demilitarized zone of the 
Eastern front were stationed the Russian. The Russian officers 
having the status of observers were taking off the triggers from 
the machine-guns of the tanks and artillery system, putting them 
into the sacks and taking in the unknown direction. 
Thus, it was the ruin of the Sokhumi (and entire Abkhazia) 
defense system and dismantling of the military infrastructure. 
The opposed party before the eyes of the Russian “peaceful” mis-
sion and with the support of that latter, not only was going to fail 
to fulfill the Sochi Agreement, but was purposefully preparing 
for the violation of the Agreement and the decisive attack. 
On September 12 of 1993 in Gudauta, at the General Staff of 
the so-called Commander-in –Chief a military meeting was held 
which passed the final operative plan and stated September 16 
as the date of starting of the advance. The last directives were 
given to the Russian Army units stationed in Abkhazia, how 
and in which direction to attack the Georgian subdivisions and 
in which zones to help the preliminarily stationed Abkhazian 
groupings. The main emphasis was given to the transit lines of 
the demilitarized zones and sectors, having the operative func-
tion of advance corridors (for the Abkhazian party) and blocking 
lines (for the Georgian party) organized by the Russian units. 
In the process of elaborating, approving and determining of 
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the operative plan of advance on Sokhumi by the General Staff 
the leading role of the Commander of the General Staff of the 
Russian Army - General – Colonel M. Kolesnikov is obvious71. 
During the assault on Sokhumi he reported to the Parliament 
of Russia in his speech, made on September 19, that in 2-3 days 
the ton of Sokhumi would fall.72 
We have another significant operative data associating 
Vice-President A. Rutskoi with the military operation of taking 
Sokhumi; On September 19 of 1993 the captured M. Demianov (V. 
Ardzinba’s counselor in the matters of the Russian special service) 
in his testimony given to the interrogation said, that “the assault 
on Sokhumi was accomplished by the order of A. Rutskoi.”73 
At dawn, on September 19 of 1993, at 4 a.m. the Eastern 
front formations of the enemy undertook an unexpected ad-
vance in the Ochamchire district from the Arakichi-Atara zone 
in the direction of Adziujba. On September 16, for the 1 p.m. 
from the demarcation line in Gumista an advance was started 
in the direction of Sokhumi. The war was renewed, due to the 
open and crafty violation of the Sochi Agreement by the Ab-
khazian party and its protector-ally Russia. 
On September 16-30 of 1993 the peripeteia of the battles and 
its operative-tactic context is widely known.74 Neither on the 
Gumista front, nor in the Babushera airport sector and Eastern 
front, the deceived and disoriented Georgian party could not 
manage to restore the military technical structure existing be-
fore the Agreement. Even the more: they were not able to form 
a more or less stabile operative defense zones and tactic sectors. 
On September 17 with the help of active support of the 
special units of the Russian army the formations of the enemy 
crossed the river Gumista, took control over the both bridges 
71. Newspaper “Republic of Abkhazia”, December 24 of 2008.  
72. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 210. 
73. The Crucified Georgia, Saint-Petersburg., 1995, p. 113.  
74. Jojua D. Fall of Sokhumi, p. 111-169. 
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and occupied the South-Western part of the village Achada-
ra. On the evening of September 19 the Russian –Confeder-
ate forces occupied the village Achadara and via the highway 
bridge transported numerous military techniques to the front 
line. On the evening of September 20 the battles took place at 
the entrance of the town. On September 25 the enemy took the 
so-called old settlement and on September 26 fell a new district 
and the railway station. 
On the morning of September 27 the mass attack of the 
enemy began upon the central part of Sokhumi. In the same 
evening after occupying the building of the Council of Min-
isters On September 28 the main attack forces of the Russian 
–Abkhazian-Confederates coalition broke though the Georgian 
picket standing to the East of the Kelasuri bridge and entered 
the Gulripsh district. On September 29 fell the Sokhumi airport 
of Babushera and the enemy reached the river Kodori. On Sep-
tember 29-30 the formations of the enemy on the Eastern front 
factually without any resistance, one by one occupied Ocham-
chire, Gali and reached the administrative border of Gali and 
Zugdidi districts located on the river Enguri. 
As we have already mentioned, on September 16-30 of 1993 
in the final military operations of the war zenith-artillery, land-
ing paratroopers and air force regiment and units of the Russian 
Federation took an active part. The military ships of the Black 
Sea Fleet of Russia played a crucial role in encircling Sokhu-
mi. On September 16-17 the military ships of Russia entered 
the Sokhumi-Gulripsh Aquatorium and blocked the Georgian 
communications through permanent bombing of the positions 
of the Georgian army and Babushera airport. 
Besides, on September 22 the squadron of the Russian ships 
brought up at the estuary of the river Kodori for landing the 
troops to the South flank of the Georgian units. Only the effec-
tive actions of defense system against the coastal guards (its oper-
ative line covered the area of 20-23 kilometers) did not allow the 
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Russian Navy to land the Troops in rear of the Ochamchire front. 
Mass involvement of the Russian regular military forces into 
the Abkhazian war is an obvious reality and this problem is no 
longer an object of manipulatory veiling in the traditional Rus-
sian discourse. It is canonized in the modern scientific and edu-
cational space of Russia. E.g. In school manuals on “Social Study” 
published before the 2008 August war is written, that “Georgia 
lost in the battle with Separatism. It could not manage to prolong 
its military stay in Abkhazia. The Georgian Army entered on the 
territory of Abkhazia in 1992 after fierce battles in a year forced-
ly left Sokhumi. Abkhazians strengthened with the Russian artil-
lerists, troopers and pilots undertook the crucial attack and drove 
out the Georgian Army beyond the borders of Abkhazia. Abkha-
zia declared itself an independent Republic…”75 This is notewor-
thy and remarkable, that admission of the direct participation of 
Russia in the Abkhazian war of the Russian –Georgian conflict 
of the years of 1992-1993 is not only the object of the Russian 
public opinion and mass consciousness, but a part of the social 
cognition and professional consciousness ( historical, politolog-
ical, military-historical), especially from the self-admission and 
forceful self-reflection aspects. 
As for the participation of the Russian irregular military for-
mations, this factor also made a serials influence on the process 
of the military operations and development of events. The main 
thing of that chain was the fact, that in coordination with the 
Russian regular army units the non-formal military structures 
determined the outcome of the war and created the background 
for Georgia’s failure. 
The irregular component of the Russian-Abkhazian-Con-
federate coalition common army structure ( i.e. the integrity 
of the units of combatant formations being financed by credit 
lines of the state and private organizations and recruited on the 
territory of Russia by the special service and political-admin-
75. Kravchenko A., Pevtsova E. Social Studies, M., 2007 p. 28. 
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istrative organizations and repositioned to Abkhazia),played a 
crucial role in defining of the outcome of the war, not only 
quialitatively, but from the operative-tactic provision aspect of 
the military operations. 
The intervention net of the Russian irregular forces or sub-
jects of the hybrid wars was especially used at the final stage of 
the war, during the general advance on Sokhumi. The major 
part of the combatants participating in that operation was hired 
by the apparatus of the Commander of the “Russian National 
Legion” N. Lisenko with the financial support of the Moscow 
firm “Continent”. 
It is remarkable, that in the system of operative grouping of 
advance on Sokhumi the Abkhazian formations played the func-
tion of the reserve maneuver subdivision. During the advance on 
the central part of Sokhumi and namely the assault on the House 
of Government the crucial part belonged to the tactic grouping 
consisting of the Russian –Armenian-Confederate subdivisions. 
 Besides the Special grouping of the Russian regular army 
Khbardinian, Armenian and Russian-Cossack formations under 
the command of I.Kononov (Chieftain of the second brigade 
of the Cossacks), N. Gusko (Chieftain of the first brigade of the 
Cossacks) and O.Petrov (commander of the separate division) 
were also included in the grouping. As it turned out, the above 
mentioned formations of Cossacks (together with the united 
regiment of the “Confederation of the Caucasian Highlanders”) 
as far back as after the Sochi Agreement were left in Abkhazia 
on the territory controlled by the Separatists. They acted in the 
regime of renewal of the war. The protocol of interrogation of 
one of the captured Russian officer V. Zabotin is the proof of it. 
V. Zabotin said, that (and later that testimony was confirmed 
by Captain Nikolaev), that “Agreement made on July 27, which 
meant withdrawal of all the formations and volunteers of Con-
federates remained only on the paper”).In spite of the Agree-
ment separate divisions under the command of Oleg Petrov 
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remained on their positions, as well as the first brigade of the 
Cossacks under the command of Chieftain Nikolai Gusko and 
united regiment and battalion of the Confederates.”76 
The following fractions from the Russian irregular net includ-
ed in the assault grouping were known: “Eshera” battalion group 
(Commander - Major R. Semiulin), brigade of the battalion “Rosia” 
( Commander - Major V. Metelev), 50 –men brigade of the group-
ing “Russian Legion” ( Commander -General – Major I. Lunev, 
with the nickname “Rusak”), brigade of the formation “Slavbat” 
( Commander - Major G. Kolodin, with the nickname “Koloda”). 
When the Russian journalists A.Chelnikov (“Izvestia”) and 
V. Chertinov (“Smena”) name particular gunmen, who killed 
the peaceful, Georgian population of Sokhumi with an ex-
traordinary cruelty and brutality. Among them are the former 
soldiers, who escaped from the disciplinary battalions of Rus-
sia, sniper Mari Kozina, with the nickname “Ludoedka”, Oleg 
Tanitski and others.77 
A. Chelnokov gives us the operative picture of the decisive 
attack and marks: “The leading force during the attack was the 
Cossacks. After them came battalions of Abkhazians, Chechens, 
Ossetians, Adigheians, altogether 10 battalions…in the centre 
of town on Rustaveli street chieftain of Cossacks Nikoloz Gusko 
Commanded the onset.”78 
Captain of air-forces of Russia M. Bondarenko guided the 
direction of the landing troops. Colonel of the air-born troops 
of Russia A. Sidorenko commanded the advance grouping amd 
coordinated the general operative coordintaion of the assault. 
The military-sea grouping under the command of Admiral 
Kasatanov consisting of nine military ships belonging to the 
Black Sea Navy of Russia took part in the operation. Evacuation 
of the refugees from the Sokhumi port was the main argument 
for that mission. In reality squadron of Kasatanov participated 
76. Crucified Georgia, Saint-Petersburg, 1995, p. 111-120. 
77. Ibid.
78. Crucified Georgia, Saint-Petersburg, 1995, p. 111-120.
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in the operation of taking Sokhumi and helped blocking of the 
Black Sea Aquatorium of Sokhumi-Ochamchire (he also tried 
to land the sea-born forces into the rear of the Georgian units). 
In the above mentioned letter of “Helsinki Watch” unambigu-
ously talks about it; It read: “ The authorities of the Ukraine ex-
pressed their protest to the Russian party, when that latter sent 
its nine military ships under the commandment of Admiral Igor 
Kasatanov to the Sokhumi controlled by the Georgian forces. 
The Ukraine expressed its disturbance in regard to the fact that 
the Black Sea Navy ships staffed with the Ukrainian crews were 
to be used in the Georgian –Abkhazian conflict district with the 
unknown purposes and orders made from Moscow.”79 
Unceremonious Violation of the Sochi Agreement by the 
Abkhazian party forced the authorities of Russia to react to that 
fact. As Russia was the formal mediator and guarantee of non- 
renewal of the war! But the response of the Kremlin was ( Si-
lence of B. Eltsin, Statement made by A; Kozirev, briefings made 
by B. Pastukhov on September 19, 21, 24 etc.), was superficial, 
full of demagogical declarations and what is the main without 
any traditionally accepted sanctions and repressalia towards the 
violator of the Agreement. Violation of the Sochi Agreement 
by the Abkhazian party and responsibility of only one party 
in renewal of the military actions was definitely recorded in 
the appeal sent towards the Georgian authorities by the Rus-
sian sector of “united Commission on the Conflict Resolution” 
consisting of S. Shoigu, V. Shuikov and B. Pastukhov. Besides, 
b. Pastukhov declared: “The blame on violation of the Sochi 
Agreement is fully on the conscience of the Abkhazian par-
ty…A agree with this opinion, as the witness of the events…”80 
For the Kremlin it was not a secret, that the only way for freez-
ing the military actions and restoring of the truce regime was 
79. “Helsinki watch” - to the Authorities of Russia www. valberta.ca/
hhihejro/NG 93 95 /1145166.html
80. Vladislav Ardzinba deceived all of us. . heltsincerter.ru/digest/
release/den-za-dnem-1oktybya-1
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blockage of onset on Sokhumi. Russia chose the way of avoid-
ing the confession of reality and as it is widely accepted in di-
plomacy abstinence from “recognition, that a spade is spade.” 
On September 19 Prime-Minister V. Chernomirdin signed 
the order of the Russian Government “On the arrangements 
made in regard to the violation of Sochi Agreement by the Ab-
khazian party”, where was marked: “In case of the further 81 
violation the Sochi Agreement by the Abkhazian party to take 
actions maintained by the international legislation and videli-
cet, to stop delivery of electric power to Abkhazia” (SIC).82 
It was a manifestation of a mixture of political cynicism, 
demagogy and amoral deeds. The guarantee State in regard to 
the party violating the Agreement (the military advances of 
which “further” did not contain any signs of the Agreement) 
instead of abstinence from the strategic actions (there are only 
three types of them – threat of punishment, depriving of the 
values or compulsory shift to the punishment regime) it settled 
for the threat of stopping of the delivery of electric power and 
other secondary superficial sanctions. 
At the final stage of the war in Abkhazia, within the complex 
of arrangements preliminary planned against Georgia, the main 
part was played by the diplomatic activity of Russia. We mean the 
“crisis diplomacy”, which was conducted simultaneously with the 
military actions and under the influence of that latter, or to be 
more precise the “military diplomacy” of Eltsin’s regime. The po-
litical direction of that diplomacy was the unconditional victory 
over Georgia and creation of the conventional background. 
On September 16 meeting of E. Shevardnadze with the 
special representative of Russia - B. Pastukhov was result less. 
Pastukhov’s abstract statement about the violation of the Sochi 
Agreement by the Abkhazian party changed nothing in con-
ditions of the fronts. The same can be said about the official 
81. At that time the bloodshed battles were being conducted in all the 
sectors of the both fronts. 
82. Abkhazian Labyrinth, p. 134. 
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statement of the Government of Russia made on September 16 
and the meeting of V.Ardzinba with the Minister of Defense of 
Russia P.Grachov held on September 17. It Appeared that Gen-
eral Grachov had no influence on the leader of the Separatists ( 
and all this happened on the background of the sanction order 
passed by the Government of Russia the day before) and failed 
to persuade him to return to the cease fire regime through halt-
ing of the assault. It is obvious, that all that diplomatic steps 
were directed towards hiding of the real aims of Russia and cre-
ating an illusion, that Russia wan ted to stop the advance of the 
Abkhazian party. But, in reality Russia was a participant of that 
advance and controlled the operative situation. 
The military diplomacy of Russia (the so-called mission of 
General Grachov) was deprived of all the traditionalism, the 
rules for that procedures accepted for that kind of situation and 
the necessary symmetry. Their main aim was to tactically en-
circle E. Shevardnaze and his environment and to bargain with 
the Georgian party being encircled. Needless to say, about the 
mechanisms of the prevention of the critical situation, desire of 
restoring of the 16 September status quo, abstention of the Ab-
khazian party or of the both - Georgian and Abkhazian parties. 
All this could not have been real arising out of the Russian “mil-
itary diplomacy” imperial position. At night of September 16-
17 in Adler behind the closed doors was held E. Shevardnadze’s 
and P.Grachov’s meeting. Grachov bluntly told him, that for dis-
charging of the critical situation it was necessary to bring into 
the conflict zone of the grouping of the Russian army. Simulta-
neously a negotiation was taking place in Moscow between She-
vardnadze’s military advisor General L. Sharashenidze and Head 
of the Operational Department of the General Staff General-Col-
onel S. Galkin. The question was the restoration of the military 
presence of the Russian in Georgia and statement of the military 
status of the bases. But during the dialogue, besides, the men-
tioned problem the Russian party posed the issue of stationing of 
the additional air-born divisions (Pskov and Tula divisions) with 
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the further prospect of repositioning of one of them to Azerbai-
jan. On September 17 the parties agreed on the statement proj-
ect “on the status of the Russian army in Georgia.”83 The second 
question remained open: Apparently, the Georgian party refused 
to position the two divisions and General Sharashenidze also re-
fused to comply with the claim of the Russian generalship at the 
September 17 meeting, similarly as Shevardnadze said nay to the 
Grachov’s claim at night meeting of September 16 -18 in Adler. 
The “Military diplomacy” of Russia became active form the 
very moment the Abkhazian party renewed the war and it acted 
in double pressure and thematic tactic lines: The critical situation 
being created due to the united advance on Sokhumi was used by 
Russia for bargaining with desperate Georgia on the two strategic 
interests: For simultaneous provision of the geostrategic interest 
of legitimization of the military bases stationed on the territory 
of Georgia and additional interest of stationing of the military 
components. Connection of the Russian-Georgian military-po-
litical negotiations with the bringing in the air-born troop and 
connection of that latter with the factor of the general advance 
excludes the possibility of making different conclusions. 
It must be said, that after the first meeting in Adler P.Grachov 
made a hopeful statement in regard with the mediatory guar-
antees of Russia. But, that statement was refuted on the very 
same day September 17 in the Supreme Council and General 
Staff of Russia. Even the more: the Head of the General Staff M. 
Kolesnikov, as we have already mentioned, stated that, Sokhu-
mi would fall in three days. Taking into account the reaction-
ary protest of the Parliament and General Staff, on the back-
ground for the closed meeting with V. Ardzinba in Gudatua, P. 
Grachov changed his position in several hours: On September 
18 at the Press conference he “generalized” the question of re-
newal of the war. Instead of repressalia of the Sochi Agreement 
violator the Minister of Defence of Russia decared,that “neiter 
83. Newspaper “Abkhazian Meridian”, N10, October, 2012. 
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Georgian, nor the Abkhazian parties long for peace.” 
This declaration made by P. Grachov together with the cun-
ning positioning of the Russian elite ( we have only to recall the 
missions of B. Pastukhov and S. Shoigu in Sokhumi) clearly show 
one more additional line of the diplomatic strategy of the Kremlin: 
If from the military aspect Russia gave a helping hand to the Sep-
aratists in military matters, from the political-diplomatic point of 
view it chose an ambivalent game of the double standard creating 
the illusion, that it wanted to stop the war and desired peace, sta-
bility, but the fighting parties did not give it any chance. 
On September 21 in Adler was held the second meeting of 
E. Shevardnadze and P. Grachov. From the Georgian party the 
meeting was attended by the Minister of Defense G. Khrkha-
rashvili, Head of the informational-intelligence service I. Ba-
tiashvili, A. Kavkasidse, and from the Russian party – B. Pas-
tukhov and representatives of the General Staff.84 
During the negotiations the Georgian party called form 
Russia to fulfill the guaranteeing obligations taken by Russian 
by the Sochi Agreement - i.e. blocking of the assault of the Ab-
khazian party of at least to keep the military neutrality. 
But the regime of Eltsin revealed its imrepialistic insidious 
nature. We’ll be objective, to say, that it was the moment when 
imperialistic nature was revealed in its concentric form and 
with all the resources accumulated all in one. 
On September 21 Negotiations held in Adler Grachov took prin-
cipled stand when said, that “the problem of Abkhazia will be settled 
and for this purpose only two full-fledged divisions are needed.”85 
While posing his position, the Minister of Defense of Russia 
presented the project of the document for the corresponding 
Agreement (in case of fulfilling of this Agreement) with the 
Russian terms and a plan-map for implementation. In the proj-
ect for the Agreement were stipulated the conditions of bring-
84. Batiashvili I. The Plot…, p. 9-10. 
85. Sevardnadze E. Thoughts on the Past and the Future. 2005, p. 177. 
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ing into Georgia (including Abkhazia) of the two Russian divi-
sions with approximately 30 thousand military contingents, as 
for the map it described the places of transporting and station-
ing of the divisions among them in the direction of Azerbaijan. 
The “project of Grachov „ needs special analyses. It clearly 
shows the fact, that Russia did not consider the as the form of 
fulfilling of its mediatory obligations the already existing package 
of duties and videlicet, the sanctioned intervention according to 
the Agreement. The legal nature of the Sochi Agreement provid-
ed not only sanctioning of such intervention, but the obligatory 
legitimating of that latter. I.e. the dispositional part of the Sochi 
Agreement obliges Russia to undertake the compulsory measures 
of refraining intervention and at the same time, it prepared the 
legitimate basis for that kind of intervention. For fulfilling all 
said above in Abkhazia Russia had all the necessary resources in 
face of the operative grouping of the Russian Army. 
For stopping the advance on Sokhumi the Kremlin made 
new terms: stationing of the two specialdivisions and one bri-
gade in Georgia on the basis of the separate agreement and also 
in Azerbaijan via our country ( to make Georgia the initiator 
of the Russian intervention in the neighboring country or at 
least the tactic). It meant occupation of certain part of the ter-
ritory of Georgia and presumably the prospect of annexation. 
In exchange for this Georgia at the best would receive conser-
vation of the war on the Gumista and Ochamchire fronts with 
the indefinite period and not the full-fledged and full – scale 
resolution of conflict or at least creation of the platform for it. It 
is remarkable, that Russia turned to the measures of safety: ev-
erybody who were in Sokhumi at that time remember the long 
column of buses ( Ikaruses) arrived in the airport of Babushera 
in order to transport the personal staff of the division being 
brought into Sokhumi, everybody remember S. Shoigu and B. 
Pastukhov to be commanders of that operation. 
From the inner plot and likeness of the contents is it clear, 
that the “Project of Grachov” was the operative part of the Rus-
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sian plan of the “Caucasian War” (we have mentioned above), 
but the consent of the Georgian Government being in the des-
perate situation die to the Sokhumi assault on provision of the 
Agreement basics was regarded as a mechanism of its realiza-
tion. It goes without saying. But is not excluded, that the above 
mentioned project to be the long-term strategic element of 
Russian planning: one of the tactic or operational part of the 
geostrategic plan having made in autumn of 1991 in the Krem-
lin. The plan pursued restoration of the influence of Russia in 
the Caucasus and of the closed geospace of control. In the State 
and Military hierarchy of Russia long-term military existence 
of Russia in the South Caucasus was considered of a paramount 
importance in the State and Military Hierarchy of Russia. Mili-
tary existence was thought not as the united, unified, military- 
territorial organization of the Soviet time “Trans Caucasian 
Military District”, but as diversified net, Enclave having the 
geostrategic status ( military bases, special militarized centers, 
the so-called peaceful missions etc.). After the fall of Sokhumi 
the afterwards “Peaceful Mission” and the special divisions of 
“Grachov’s Project” were regarded as the parts of that net. 
It is logical to think, that the “Caucasian war” and “Grachov’s 
Project” were the components of the plan of the year of 1991. 
In case, it is not true and the “Grachov’s Project” is to be ex-
amined in a more specific dimension – as the document of the 
direct “military diplomacy” of Russia to the existing situation, 
even then its organic connection with the secret plan of the 
“Caucasian War” is obvious.  
At the meeting in Adler it was difficult to find more or less 
acceptable compromise with the Russian-Separatists block and 
the Georgian party neglected the “Grachov’s Project” and as a 
result the negotiations were called off.  
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III. OUTCOME OF THE WAR OF THE YEARS 
OF 1992-1993 
In September of 1993 the fall of Sokhumi was followed by 
the temporary interruption of the jurisdiction and territorial 
sovereignty of the central power of Georgia on Abkhazia, oc-
cupation of the whole Abkhazia by Russia under the mask of 
the so-called peaceful operation, genocide and the purposeful 
policy of the ethnic cleansing of the ancient Georgian region, 
liquidation of the majority of the Georgian demography, large-
scale humanitarian catastrophe, disintegration of the order of 
the Georgian territorial-space and Georgian State structure, 
split of the Georgian –Abkhazian cultural integrity, creation of 
the base for the Russianization of Abkhazia and its Russian eth-
nical, military and economic colonization. 
By the way, in an open letter sent by a group of intelli-
gentsia (N. Krimov, O. Tabakov, M. Zakharov, O. Efremov, L. 
Libediskaia and others) to President Eltsin on November 30 of 
1993 is said about the genocide and ethnical cleansing. Here are 
the excerpts from the latter:” The process of mass massacre of 
the peaceful Georgian population had place in Abkhazia… the 
tragic list of destroyed forty years ago by the Fascists Oradur, 
Liditse, Khatin population is being continued with the names of 
the Abkhazian villages and districts… Investigation of the facts 
of mass destruction of the peaceful population of Abkhazia and 
punishment of the war criminals is crucial.”86 
Results of the years of 1992-1993 are in full coincidence in the 
first place with the Russian imperial idea based on the violence 
and lie and hegemonic regional geostrategy of Russia. Arising out 
of that geostrategy Russia conducted the so-called peaceful pro-
cess in the years of 1993-2008, making provision of stagnation of 
86. An open letter to President of Russian Federation B. Eltsin from 
Moscow Intelligentsia. “Nezavisimaia Gazeta” (Independent News-
paper), November 30 of 1993.  
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the conflict, inactivity of the regulatory mechanisms and preser-
vation of the long-term situation of non-regulation. 
After the full-scale military intervention of Russia in Georgia 
and the Russian –Georgian war of the August of the of year of 
2008, through blatant violation of the fundamental norms of In-
ternational Legislation and ignoring of the civilized principles of 
the International Order, Russia recognized the so-called indepen-
dence of Republic of Abkhazia on the basis of the also so-called 
Agreement made with the Marionette grouping of Sokhumi and 
occupied territory of Abkhazia and its factual military annexation. 
The delict of 2008 being continued till the present days 
clearly showed the planning and conducting of the hybrid war 
of the years of 1992-1993. 
The war of 1992-1993 radically changed the historical ter-
ritorial order of Georgia - destroyed the structural integrity of 
our territory. The war significantly changed the last 20 year 
history of Georgia and greatly influenced inner evolution of the 
Georgian State. 
After the bloodshed 12 months war Russia managed with 
its abundant forces and relying on the Abkhazian Separatists 
to appropriate historical North-West Georgia - Abkhazia. On 
the captured territory the Russian - Separatist Alliance started 
to systematically uproot the elements of Georgian civilization, 
to methodically destroy the national existence of Georgians. It 
must be admitted, that the moral of the enemy was partially bar-
baric and in pursuing the anti-Georgian policy every methods 
were accepted for them. The genocide and total ethnic cleans-
ing of the Georgian population is an obvious example, as well as 
ruin of the cultural monuments of Georgia and periodic waves 
of the ethnocide. As a result, the region split from Georgia, the 
Georgian gene was factually destroyed and the Georgian gene 
and culture are frozen in the anti-Georgian barbarism. 
All this was done pruposefully, nethodically, though prelim-
inary planning of the imeprail policy and not spontyaniusly, as 
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a form of forceful reaction to the proverbial “Georgian Aggres-
sion”, as it is pumped by the Russian-Abkhazian propaganda. 
The Russian- Georgian August war of the year of 2008, recog-
nition of the “Independence” of Abkhazia by Russia, within the” 
Agrement of Friendship and Mutual Help” (2009) “ legalizing” of 
the miltiary bases in that ancient corner of Georgia, establishment 
of the direct control of the Kremlin and political protectorate on 
the occupational regime of Abkhazia within the frames of the 
“Alliance and Partnership” (2014.) Created qualitatively new geo-
political reality and situation. Geostrategic configuration radical-
ly changed around Abkhazia. After the August war the threat of 
prolongation of the results of the war of 1992-1993 is real. Namely, 
the destructive occupational policy of Russia during the August 
war and after war period created the real threat, that the crisis re-
sulted due to the war of 1992-1993 to turn into the long-term ter-
ritorial-political order and even the more – to become legitimate 
through legitimating of the so-called proverbial “new reality”. 
The analyses of the war of 1992-1993 and the participation 
of Russia in it will give us the inner impulse not to allow this 
suicidal prospect, not to permitt it penetrate into the cunningly 
shoved “act of regulation” or “compromised format.” Study of 
that process will enable us to turn a”new reliaty” into a political 
thruth and never recognize the territorial-political order estab-
lished as a result of intervention of Russia 
The study of the problematic issues gives us the possibility 
of making the following occlusions: 
1. 1992-1993. The war in Abkhazia is not only the Georgian 
–Abkhazian ethno conflict, but Russian - Georgian Military 
Conflict, International and Intrastate conflict with the signs of 
the regional conflict; 
2. 1992-1993. The undeclared war against Georgia launched 
by Russia, from the typological aspect is the hybrid war. The 
special and differential research on the intervention of Russia 
in the war enables us to make the like conclusions. 
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Russia launched the multidirectional and multidimensional 
hybrid war - with the help of the regular army, irregular paramil-
itary formations, groups of special service, with the coordination 
of strategic and operative-tactic management and with the help 
of the military-technique, military-expert, financial-economic 
and ideological-propagandist Separatist regime, through the dip-
lomatic and ideological pressure on the Georgian authorities; 
3. 1992-1993. The purpose of Russia’s participation in the war 
was not only defense of the Abkhazians from the “Georgian ag-
gression”, but exploiting of the Abkhazian separatist movement 
against Georgia for launching of the expansionistic war. 
But the Kremlin had the specifically thought strategy and 
through the support of the illegitimate secession movement of 
the rebelled Abkhazians against the central power of Georgia 
covered that process under the false mask of “ethno conflict”. 
Thus, the anti-Georgian block of Russian imperialism and Ab-
khazian separatism in 1992-1993 wrote a story of the war, unit-
ing the indirect intervention of Russia and military support of 
the Abkhazian secession movement. Outwardly, it seemed that 
the reversed part of the story was motivated by the halting of 
the “Georgian Aggression” directed towards the small ethnic 
group and aim of the mediatory mission in the current ethno 
conflict. The material given in the work totally destroys the 
informational-propagandist clichés. 
4. The military intervention of Russia as a system factor be-
came crucial during the defeat of Georgia in the war of 1992-
1993 and temporary territorial disintegration. In spite of the 
chronic crisis existing in Georgia and ruin of the institutional 
system, namely in the field of the military construction, the 
armed forces of the country outnumbered the Abkhazian-Con-
federate formations, they rank above them in moral- fighting 
spirit, military-operative art and tactic thinking. The victory 
was deprived from Georgia by Russia, and namely that unde-
clared war frustrated ruin of Separatism. 
5. The strategic researches conducted on the Russian-Geor-
79
gian relations based on the correlation analyses are erroneous; 
On the one hand, they reveal the correlation between the in-
ner character of the Russian regime and the aggression towards 
Georgia on the other hand, it shows the correlation between the 
strategic principles of Russian policy and foreign orientation of 
Georgia. The formula of the first correlation develops a thesis, 
arising out of the false and axiomatic understanding of the liberal 
thinking, that democratic Russia or the Constitutional regime of 
the Kremlin defending the legitimate State and principles of the 
political pluralism won’t have tendencies for aggression towards 
Georgia. The second correlation formula relies on the thesis, that 
the aggressive policy of Russia is not only connected with the 
pro-Western orientation of Georgia, but is triggered by it and 
the desire of integrating into the anti-Russian global structures; 
Consequently, that policy will change in case of returning of our 
country to the Russia orbit or choosing the course of neutrality. 
Videlicet, the discourse of the Abkhazian war enables us to 
in a well - argued manner neglect the like correlation ideas. Rus-
sia of the years of 1992-1993 , or “Eltsin’s Russia” at the initial 
stage of its development was in the Post Soviet space the most 
democratic and somewhat liberal regime among those existing 
for the last centuries ( with “Gaidar’s Reforms”, technocratism of 
Chubais, regional decentralization, distribution of power in the 
Supreme Council between President Eltsin and Khazbulatov). 
Anyway, it was the Russia, which did what it did in Abkhazia. 
In 1992 1993 Georgia was at the initial stage of its development 
and was extremely proRussian. Besides, the influence of Russia 
had the institutional character and Shevardnadze appointed the 
heads of the government institutions and namely the ministers of 
the power structure block with the prompt or the Kremlin. 
Thus, Russia is fighting with Georgia of any inner foreign 
orientation (in conditions of not participating in the imperial 
structure of Russia) within the a priori and strategical definite-
ness. This realistic opinion has been turned into the obvious 
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